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Glasnost, or openness, was initiated by Mikhail S. Gorbachev in the former Soviet
Union as a supplement to his primary reform of perestroika, or re-structuring. This
study focuses on the glasnost reform, arguing that while perestroika addressed
economics glasnost encouraged democratization in society. Primarily, the study
examines the social discourse that was ultimately affected as a result of glasnost. The
societal issues that erupted after glasnost, exhibited defiance against the regime,
particularly m terms of fundamental liberties of expression and the availability of
information.
The study also examines differences in interpretation of Gorbachev and the Soviet
population, a significant point in the explanation as to why the Communist Party
could not sustain democratic reform and maintain control of the nation. The Soviet
consciousness was conditioned by historical experience to concede to authoritarian
political systems, and the study builds an argument that Gorbachev was a product of
his culture. Therefore, the political system which V.I. Lenin erected in October 1917
served to perpetuate a mentality of political autocracy and social repression.
The presence of glasnost was literally referred to by Gorbachev as democratization,
a definition which the study examines in particular to understand why glasnost
escaped his objectives and brought about the failure of the Soviet Union under
Communist power. The term democracy is therefore treated as an intangible power in
itself that surpassed the control of the Party and in fact brought the process of
democracy to the public consciousness by allowing fi^eedom of information.
In the study a great amount of care was given to analyze Russian scholars and
authors in order to gain their unique perspective. In examining the results brought
about by glasnost's liberalizing effects the study strives to utilize specific Russian
citizens' accounts of glasnost.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

On Christmas Day of 1991 the red flag of flie Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was
unceremoniously lowered, oflBcially marking the end of that nation's existence. Earlier
on tiiat same day Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev resigned his position as Soviet
President, the unexpected culmination of his 6-ye<D' leadership of a global superpower.
The intrigue of such hi^ political drama is that the national failure of the Soviet Union
was not due to external causes, but rather the result of an internal political gamble on the
part of Gorbachev to strengttien and stabilize the Soviet Union's economic and political
situation. Perhaps the most ironic aspect of &e Soviet Union's demise was that the
Commimist Party, under the direction of Gorbachev, played the lead role in its own fall
from power.
Upon ascending to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union on March 11, 1985, Gorbachev became leader of an empire that was
increasingly stumbling in its ability to compete with other industrialized states,
particularly in terms of economics. Jeny Hough accounts for the timeline of
Gorbachev's actions in beginning the reform process that was intended to redirect the
nation's progress.
Less than six months into office, Mikhail Gorbachev told the editors of Time that
he had a "grandiose" domestic program in mind. Hjs language became more
radical at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in Februaiy-March 1986. By July
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1986 he had become still more radical, equating perestroika with revolution—in
all spheres of life, not just the economy. In 1986 he backed his words with a
series of laws and decrees that began the process of economic reform. The laws
were all good early steps. From Ihe fall of 1986 he increasingly emphasized
democratization. ^
Perestroika. or restructuring, was Gorbachev's primary reform in his objective for
resurrecting the Soviet economic situation. His publication of 1987 was entitled
Perestroika. demonstrating Gorbachev's sincere investment in his reform for reviving the
economy. Change was imperative if the Soviet Union were to sustain itself
internationally and domestically, a fact that Gorbachev addresses in his volume
Perestroika. Like his predecessors, Grorbachev assessed the problem as primarily
economic in nature. However, unlike former Russian and Soviet leaders, Gorbachev was
compelled to initiate the reform glasnost or openness, in an attempt to address corruption
in the Soviet state. As he explained in Perestroika. the only inhibitor to the success of the
nation's economic resurgence was a lack of social democracy, active participation in the
nation's progressive development, hi Gorbachev's report regarding the Twenty-Seventh
Party Congress, he calls for "the elimination of everything that interferes with
development,"^ and in Perestroika he urges:
[T]he development of democracy, criticism, and glasnost. It is no longer a
question of whether the CPSU Central Committee will continue the policy of
glasnost through the press and the other mass media and with the active
participation of citizens. We need glasnost as we need air.^

' Jeny Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR. 1985-1991 (Washington D.C.. The
Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 103.
^ Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 173.
^ Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Pere.stroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World (New York: Harper &
Row Publishers, 1987), 78.
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However, by initiating the glasnost reform Gorbachev imintentionally released a
social revolution within his own nation's borders that spiraled out of control,
challenging the Communist Party as the Soviet Union's single political authority and
ultimately driving Gorbachev and the Party system out of power.
This thesis aigues that glasnost encouraged democratization in the areas of
commimication and information which created a social revolution against the political
authority of the Commimist Party, consequently leading to the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The hypothesis will be supported by evaluating two distinct factors that
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. First, Gorbachev's reform,
glasnost, will be analyzed according to the theoretical definition of democratization and
also according to Gorbachev's intended definition, a point that is the crux of the issue. It
is essential to the argument of fliis thesis to establish that Gorbachev used glasnost in a
specific way, hoping that the reform would stimulate the population to embrace the
socialist democratic ideal. Glasnost, according to one particular accepted theoretical
defbtiition, suggests a specific direction but according to another interpretation, addresses
a diversity of opinions and interpretations. The second factor that the thesis argues
contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union revolves around the political
authoritarianism possessed by the Communist Party Because glasnost was such an
abstract concept, the refonn escaped Gorbachev's control and literally clashed with the
rigid dogma of the Communist Party. Glasnost's democratic nature could not be
reconciled with the authoritarian nature of the Party.
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It is critical to the argument to establish glasnost's impetus toward change in a nation
where, for centuries, autocratic rule defined the political and socioeconomic structures.
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the literature of such noted Soviet citizens as Andrei
Sakharov and Aleksandr Sol2iienitsyn in order to comprehend how die lack of democratic
freedoms, such as the right to freedom of speech and of the press, in the Soviet Union
created a system totally antithetical to the social democracy platform Vladimir I. Lenin
used to gain power in 1917. By evaluating the works of Russian authors, one can gain an
understanding of the democratization process which was embodied in glasnost.
hi Sakharov's volume, Memoirs, published in 1990, he reflects on the restrictions
placed on himself^ his family, and friends as well as countless other political dissidents
residing in the Soviet Union. As Sakharov explains, censorship, enforced by the KGB, or
Committee of State Security, regarding communication and freedom of expression was
always present in order to suppress social resistance and ensure political loyalty to the
Communist Party. As Sakharov recounts, his struggle for human rights started earnestly
in the mid-60's when he published a series of reform iiroposals meant to stimulate the
economy and allow intellectual freedom. The defining difference between Sakharov's
bid for social democratization and Gorbachev's glasnost reform is that each perceived the
idea of open communication as fulfilling different objectives. While Gorbachev
employed the term glasnost to enhance the Soviet system, not destroy it, Sakharov
desired open commimication and die ability to inform and be informed as a fundamental
right of humanity, regardless of the consequences to the Soviet system.
As a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975 the distinguished scientist was exiled
to Grorky with his wife, Elena Bonner by orders of the Chairman of the Presidium of the

5

Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev, in 1980.'* Sakharov presents a compelling
perspective of the struggle of political dissidents who were silenced to benefit the
Communist Party authority. Additionally, Sakharov exenq}lifies the Soviet citizen's
desire to break fi-ee of political and social oppression, and to that end he illustrates the
need for glasnost before Gorbachev advocated the reform.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, literary writer and political activist, through his literature
shed li^t on the reforms needed in the interest of democratization, hi his important
pubUcation of 1991, Rebuilding Russia. Solzhenitsyn expands on the processes and
problems that Russia must conJfront since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a Russian
citizen he offers a candid evaluation of the mentality that has inhibited social
democratization. Solzhenitsyn's insights also include tiie definition of democracy from
the Russian perspective, a valuable contribution in comprehending what glasnost means
to tile national population.^
An important part of the study in understanding glasnost's effects on the Soviet
population and on the Communist Party is met by evaluating how glasnost was
interpreted. It is interesting to note that, according to author W. Bruce Lincoln, tihe term
glasnost was initially used by the "enhghtened bureaucrats" who occupied the courts of
19'*' century Russia. What is imperative about Lincoln's account is that the Russian
definition of glasnost was altogether different from how the West understood the term.
According to Lincoln, flie term glasnost emerged to represent the necessary
commimication "important in bridging the gap between the bureaucracy and educated

^ Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York; Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1990).
' Aleksandr Solzenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals (New York; Farrar,
Strauss, and Giroux, Inc., 1991), 64.
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society which Nicholas I's firai suppression of the Decembrists had opened at the
beginning of his reign."®
lincoln's assessment of glasnost lends a firm basis to the argument that Gk>rbachev
used the term according to a particular understanding obtained firom Russian thinkers. In
the mid-19''' century the Russian courts of Nicholas I and Alexander n were marked by
the desire for change that swept across Europe during tiie Enlightenment Consequently,
many scholars and intelligentsia advocated glasnost as a way to bring public opinion to
the fore but only under tiie auspices of authority. ' From Lincoln's 1981 volume
The Vanguard of Reform comes a valuable insight into the definition glasnost took in the
19*'' century, allowing a basis of comparison witii Gorbachev's definition over one
hundred years later.
Most notable to the premise of the thesis is the accoimt of Scott Shane who published
Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union in 1994. Shanes's work
largely supports &e contention of the thesis, claiming that "[i]nfonnation slew the
totalitarian giant."^ Shanes's account is compelling because he focuses on the common
Soviet citizen, providing insight into how the public responded to the restrictions on
information and communication by the Communist Party. From artists to publishers to
political prisoners, Shane gives a wide perspective of how information and expression in
the form of art, literature, education, and opinion enables the development of identity
apart from the state. Additionally, Shane presents valuable comparisons of how the

® W. Brace Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825-1861 (DeKalb,
Illinois: Northem Illinois University Press, 1982),107'Ibid.
® Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Infonnation Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
Publisher, 1994), 6.
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Communist Party responded to glasnost as the governing authority and felt challenged
by the flow of potentially damaging information. By offsetting the viewpoints of society
and those of the Party officials the reader gains an understanding of what was at stake for
both society and the political entity. Moreover, Shane's focus enables the reader to
realize the consequences involved when the struggle for political power leads to &e
sacrifice of the society.
In establishing the contrary objectives that Gorbachev recommended, when he first
declared the use of glasnost as a reform, it is necessary to review his own literature for a
iiiller comprehension of what he hoped to accomplish. Perhaps one of the most revealing
accounts of the Commimist Party's illusion concerning social consensus comes from
Gorbachev's first book in which he outlines the reform initiatives.' It is especially
valuable in terms of establishing Gorbachev's loyalties to the Party and of his belief in
the socialist democratic system that Lenin had implemented. The countless references to
Leninist principles that Goihachev uses throughout Perestroika and speeches delivered
during his time in ofiRce point to the unyielding direction in which Gorbachev wished to
lead the Soviet Union. Yet, there is also an unmistakable difference in method found in
the leadership of Gorbachev.
Unlike his predecessors, who maintained a course that did not deviate from the Party
line, Gorbachev exhibits a flexibility and receptivity to different approaches in the
interest of motivating change in the nation. Hence, he proposed glasnost as a way to
engage the population in a discussion of issues relevant to economics and politics. The
new style approach, utilizing glasnost, was distinctive in that it offered public

' Gorbachev, Perestroika.
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participation. However, Gorbachev's platform for encouraging reform, "new thinking,"
is still packaged in the style of Party compliance, which presents a paradoxical situation
in terms of glasnost's democratic value and the rigidity of the Party structure. To observe
better the incompatibility of glasnost with the Party dogma it is reasonable to explore the
writings of the man who embodied Party principles of socialist democracy yet sou^t to
implement a democratic reform meant for social rejuvenation.
One of the best sources of comparison comes from Gorbachev's autobiography of
1995, Memoirs, in which he reflects on the course of action that he took and that
ultimately led to the failure of the Communist Party to maintain power, driving flie Soviet
Union to the collapse of 1991.^° In Memoirs, Gorbachev is acutely aware of the
corruption in Party politics in all areas of the Soviet system: economic, political, and
social, which due to a lack of progressiveness in reform, maintained the status quo of
Party authority and kept the society debilitated. Most relevait to the argument of this
thesis is Gorbachev's insight concerning his interpretation of glasnost. What he
formulates in Perestroika. die a^erence to the Leninist socialist democratization as
critical to the process of socioeconomic reform, takes on a different interpretation in
Memoirs when Gorbachev has retrospectively assessed all the changes brought to bear
upon his nation under his leadership.
By his own admission, Gorbachev acknowledges the contradictions found in his
speech that he delivered to the Congress, contradictions that he could afford to be more
introspective about at a later date. Yet, these contradictions effectively demonstrate the

Gorbachev, Memoirs.
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tenuous nature of the Communist Party system regarding political and social interaction.
Gorbachev writes:
'Contradictions' of this kind can also easily be found in other places in my report
It contains the theme generally recognized at that time, that 'by relying on the
advantages of socialism, the country has in a short historical period reached the
heists of historical and social progress.' But only two paragraphs later tiiere is a
reference to 'the need for further changes and transformations, for the
achievement of a new qualitative state of society.. .This means sweeping changes
in the area of labour and the material and spiritual conditions of life. This means
energizing the entire system of political and social institutions, a de^>ening of
socialist democratic principles, and self-govemment for the people.' '
Gorbachev's words epitomized the contradictions wiiich he, as a leader, faced in
attempting to reconcile the dysfunctional socioeconomic Soviet system with die authority
of the Communist Party. Substantial change in the Soviet Union had been hampered by
the inability of the Party to concede power in all three spheres of interest, politically,
economically, and socially. Gorbachev was challenging the Party to be receptive to
reform that would potentially affect the central political aufliority because he was
appealing to society, in addition to tiie Party, to move the nation forward. According to
JudiA Devhn, Party officials rejected the reforms outright based on a continuing
commitment to the Marxist-Leninist ideology." Market economics, promoted by
perestroika, were associated with capitalism, in direct opposition to the socialist ideology.
Particular to glasnost, few Party members were supportive to the democratization reform,
maintaining that "Leninist socialism was becoming increasingly discredited among the
radical intelligentsia."" Most Party officials refused to condone any deviation from the

" Ibid. 174.
Judith Devlin, The Rise of the Russian Democrats: Hie Causes and Consequences of the Elite Revolution
(Hants, England; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1995).
Ibid.
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Marxist-Leninist dogma based on iwinciple. Realistically, Gorbachev's "anti-Marxist
heresy" caused Soviet officials to reject any reform, economic or social that would
challenge their position of power. As Peter A. Hauslohner notes, Groibachev faced a
growing consensus within the Party apparatus tiiat resisted ''the democratization of
government and the Party,"" therefore initiating political divisions.
The struggle between Gorbachev and tiie controlling power of tiie Communist Party is
effectively described in Dusko Doder and Louise Bnmson's book of 1990, Gorbachev:
Heretic in the Kremlin. Particularly relevant to the argument of this thesis is how
Gorbachev is illustrated as a reform-minded leader who still believes in the political
premise of the Party as the vanguard of socialist democracy. However, according to
Doder and Branson, "Gorbachev would not recognize publicly the magnitude of the
contradiction between his quest for democratization and a Marxist-Leninist Party's
rule,"^^ a characterization which captures the argument of the thesis.
Essentially, the contradictions in the system and in the leadership of Gorbachev are
important ui imderstanding why he initiated siich a reform as glasnost The reform that
would bring democracy to the population in hopes that socialism would prevail proved to
be an impossible mission. This thesis takes the position that glasnost was first,
misinterpreted by Gorbachev because he was a product of his political culture and
repres^ted what he beUeved to be the correct system of government in the Soviet Union.

Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston, ed.. Milestones in Glasnost and Perestrovka: Politics and People
(Washington D.C., Brookings Institute. 1991), 47.
Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Penguin Books,
1990), 72.
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Second, the critical point revolves around glasnost as

intangible reform that escaped

Gkn-bachev's carefully executed plans for renewal of the nation. Glasnost embodied
much of what the Party deemed to be threatening to the political presence of power,
ultimately leading to Party censorship and controls placed on the population, therefore
limiting social liberties. In the interest of power, the Party was capable of maintaining
the status quo throu^ communication controls, a position that was politically pragmatic
for authoritarianism but vastly ineffective in terms of socioeconomic progress. What
Gorbachev conceived in glasnost turned out to be counter-productive for the Party and
for the survival of the Soviet Union. Yet, even if Gorbachev had never turned to glasnost
the rest of the world continued progressing despite the Party's reluctance to implement
change.
Today tiie former Soviet Union is regarded as an unsuccessful political experiment.
However, there is more at stake than a cursory evaluation of how not to conduct socialist
democracy. The real value in studying the experience of the former Soviet nation is to
gain a greater imderstanding of the interactions necessary between political power and the
society they govern if real progress is to be achieved. Statistics show that the Soviet
Union was a formidable military power and produced more industrial products such as
steel than the United States, a commendable accomplishment if a nation's resources rest
solely on militarization and the industrial output to secure militarization.^^ However,
diere are also resources that must be nurtured if progress is to occur in a nation.
Solzhenitsyn elaborates on the crisis of disequilibrium in the former Soviet Union;
Following the bitter experience of 1917, when we plunged headlong into what we
thought was democracy Vasili Maklakov, a prominent leader of the Constitutional
Shane, Dismantling Utopia. 86.
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Democrats, reminded us all of a simple truth by the following admission: "hi
order to function, democracy needs a certain level of political discipline among
the populace." But this is precisely what we lacked in 1917 and one fears that
there is even less of it today.''
Precisely because the population in Russia and tiie former Soviet Union was deprived of
participation by the political power &e threat of a social rebellion was always present.
Russia has endured more thai one crisis within its nation's borders in the 20'*'century,
and contributed to more than one international conflict. The instability of such a
powerful nation remains a valid concern for the global community as well as for the
population of Russia.
Glasnost represents what Russia was lacking to achieve national cohesion. The
writers, scientists, and leaders needed glasnost before 1985. For two centuries the
Russian society asserted itself in various rebellions in an efifort to be heard. Yet tfie
political autocracy jealously guarded its power instead of promoting the concerns for
society. This thesis argues that, placing the political power above the needs of society in
order to bring what one authority perceives as socioeconomic or political equality
ultimately costs the nation in terms of progress, and will far exceed what can possibly be
gained throu^ controlling political allegiance.
The structure of the thesis reflects the conflict between political authoritarianism and
social democratization, specifically the Communist Party and glasnost. An analysis of
literature supporting the trend of Russian rulers and Soviet leaders to promote autocracy
will provide a coimterpoint that, for two centuries, there have been a number of political
dissidents in Russian history who wwe imsuccessful because the political power had the

Solzhenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia. 65.
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authority to eradicate any opposition that came from society.
The second chapter establishes a historical foundation that supports the contention that
Russia developed into an autocracy and such a political system refused any reforms that
challenged the political authority. The chapter examines leaders who brou^t a degree of
reform to Russia and the Soviet Union, such as Peter the Great and Nikita IChrushchev,
but whose objectives were directed to bolster the autocratic power in the systems of
government.
The third chapter focuses on Gorbachev's role as Communist Party political
administrator, analyzing why he reflected the inadequacies of the system in his book
Perestroika. yet was unaware of the tremendous need for, and impact that social liberties,
such as glasnost, would provide. Additionally, the thesis argument that the Party created
the illusion of a socialist Utopia while practicing political authoritarianism is developed in
chapter three.
Qiapter four contrasts Andrei Sakharov's experience wifli Gorbachev's in order to
illustrate the social injustices which created the need for glasnost, long before tiie reform
was implemented. In addition, there will be an analysis of the struggle for freedom of
commimication among Soviet citizens drawn from the work of Scott Shane, showcasing
the effects of glasnost on the general public. This ch^ter also addresses the disparity
between the Conmnmist Party and the Soviet society in terms of communication and
political authority in order to illustrate how freedom of commimication can be an
important factor in the survival of a political system.
In the fifth chapter the effects of glasnost are illustrated through the content of
information that circulated throu^out tiie Soviet Union. The chapter reviews the
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diversity of information that erupted into society with glasnost, and virtually exploded
the myths that had propped up Party politics for decades. Additionally, there is an
analysis of Gforbachev's fall from power as a result of the imperfections revealed by
glasnost against the Party and Leninist principles.
The concluding chapter examines the structure of the Russian state and the Soviet
Union as instrumental in producing an autocracy that refused to take a progressive social
direction. In li^t of glasnost, the conclusion underscores the necessity for political
systems to facilitate dialogue witii citizens and increase the advantage for progress.

CHAPTER TWO
DEMOCRATIZATION IN RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Legacy of Political Autocracy
Nineteenth-century Russian history professor Konstantine Kavelin contends "[a]Il of
Russian history is primarily the history of the state, political history." ^ Kavelin's "state
school" theory emerges from the Westemizer perspective of Russia's history which
identifies with the Western European development of nations. Alexaider Yanov
evaluates Kavelin's "state school" theory in support of his own assertion that Russia
became an autocratic empire with the reign of Ivan IV who effectively removed any
limitations on the political power by subordinating the economic and social system to a
function performed for the benefit of the state. ^
According to Yanov, the system of government tiiat grew out of Russia upon the
expulsion of the Tatars amounted to a strange hybrid of despotism and absolutism
because the economic power and the ideological power of society were arrested by the
power of the Tsar. Yanov argues that tiie defining feature occurred under Tsar Ivan the
Terrible when he implemented the Oprichnina, "the nucleus of autocracy which

' Alexander Yanov, The Origins of Autocracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1981), 242-43.
^Ibid.
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determined.. .the entire subsequent historical process in Russia."^ Yanov describes
the relevance of the Oprichnina to Russian political development:
If Charles Montesquieu invented the separation of powers, then Ivan ttie Terrible
invented the separation of functions between powers. The separation of powers
leads, as history has shown, to democracy. ITie separation of fimctions leads to
autocracy. This was the true political significance of the Oprichnina.. .a means
for maximization of political control wi& a minimiim of administration.''
Yanov goes on to explain tiiat, due to tfie division of territoiy under Ivan IV, a social
mentality of division in order to secure national power became the accepted standard of
political and economic development. Yanov's theoiy emphasizes the use of terror,
delivered by the Oprichniki, or the political police, under the Tsar's orders, which
essentially demanded allegiance of the population to the political and economic stiucture.
Under such a system no possible means of participation or competition could result
because the source of power was removed from the population.
Russian autocracy is described by Yanov in reference to Montesquieu's philosophy
that suggests the separation of powers in Western Europe led to a monarchy with an
aristocratic class while Russia never developed an aristocracy with independent economic
power.' According to Montesquieu, the natural class structure which emerges from a
monarchy produces a society that is self-interested, creating ambition in the interest of
acquisition of wealth or status. The presence of competition inspires performances based
upon honor, a characteristic Montesquieu claims acts as the cohesion of a competitive

^ Ibid., 68.
" Ibid., 69' Emile Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rosseau: Forerunners of Sociology (Michigan: The University of
Michigan Press, 1983), 24-35.
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society, but which he cautions "is possible only if men have a certain concern for
dignity and freedom."^
Emile Durkheim's analysis examines the social classification theory put forth by
Montesquieu in ^ effort to understand why societies differ in political order.
A despotism is either a variety of monarchy in which all the orders have been
abolished and there is no division of labor, or a democracy in which all the
citizens except the ruler are equal, but equal in a state of servitude. Thus it has
the aspect of a monster, in which only the head is alive, having absorbed aU the
energies of the oiganism. The principle of such social life in such a society can
be neither virtue, because the people do not participate in the affairs of the
community, nor honor, because there are no differences of status. If men adhere
to such a society, it is from passive submission to the prince's will, that is solely
fiamfear?
Durkheim's analysis supports Yanov's argument that Russia's unique autocratic empire
was the result of an abolition of economic and social power, and the institution of an
administrative order that consolidated the political authority. Yanov goes on to make
another convincing point relevant to this thesis. The consolidation of power requires "the
minimization of ideas . . .so that the thought of the possibility of challenging the constant
plundering of the economy cannot even arise."* With the elimination of economic
competition, the necessity of eliminating ideological participation is paramount if the
state is to retain its dominance.
Having established the trends of Western Europe to democratic behavior and of
Russia to autocracy, it still remains to explain why Russia, despite such a dominant
political structure was given to extremist politics throughout history. Precisely because
there was a lack of organized competition in the system, Russian struggles with power
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were marked by violence and strategic plotting in order to gain the upper hand. As
Yanov reminds, Russian history exhibits a pattern of full-scale social and economic
dominance exerted by the poUtical power of the era, followed by a period of revolution,
reforms, or relaxation of tiie power. Yet, the aforementioned period is always temporary,
overshadowed by the inheritance of being politically dominated and unable to rally a
broader support for permanent change.^ Such tendencies can be explained by tiie term,
'Reactionary politics," when the opposition to the old system is present but the impetus to
effect progressive change is lacking. Challenging the authority of the system is one thing
while challenging the system itself is quite another.
According to Yanov, Russia demonstrates the disposition to reactionary politics
primarily because the nation has become too dependent on one resource of power. This
ailment is supported by tiie patrimonial identity which Russia and the Soviet Union
embraced, particularly after the expulsion of the Tatars which forced the necessity to
create a strong national image. As long as ttie identity of the authority was firmly woven
into the national consciousness the possibility of success for reform was sUm.
The mentality of defense was foremost in the objectives of both the rulers and of the
people who had endured the Tatar pillaging of Russian lands, starting in 1242 and lasting
for more than two centuries. Such an experience created the fortitude to erect a national
defense structure that would secure the people. The terms for security, therefore, were of
little importance at that time because tiie struggle for the Russians was to defend
themselves, not to free themselves. Consequently, the &st Russian Tsar, Ivan HI, built a
national power based on the idea of "collectivization" in order that the lands and the
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19

population could be safe from the enemy. HansVon Eckhardt argues that during the
Muscovite era "the idea of the reason of the state began to germinate."^" Establishing an
identity capable of consolidating the nation was also accomplished under the reigns of the
first two Russian Tsars, Ivan HI and Ivan IV. Patrimony was introduced by the middle of
tiie 16*''century, but the power of the patrimonial identification emerged with Peter the
Great.
Peter I took the first title, "Russian Enq)eror'' iq)on the Peace of Nystatdt in the fall of
1721,^^ and began plans for the creation of a capital built exclusively for tiie defense of
the state. Prior to the construction of St. Petersburg, Russian cities were built to defend
only themselves. Peter's penchant for rationaUty and order can be seen in the straight
lines of St. Petersburg's architecture. Under Peter I, mass militarization occurred
primarily because the Tsar was involved in numerous conflicts, and also because he was
driven to excel in forging a powerful military establishment.
As a Tsar, Peter assumed the position of military commander, but the position
influenced his reforms and political administration to be advantageous to the state power
but disastrous to the population that were subjected to his command. With Peter's
direction Russia saw reforms that enforced service to the state, excluding no one.
According to Anisimov, "Peter had carefully jM-ovided that nobody 'got out' of service or
the tax assessment or some form of occupation,

a situation that consolidated the
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society under the power of the Tsar. Moreover, Anisimov makes Ihe case that the first
Law Code of 1649 tied servants to their masters during the lifetime of the master but set
the legal standard of slavery to be selected fi-om the "free and itinerant" population. The
idea of "free people" was removed entirely under Peter's reforms, and the term came to
be associated with the fugitives of society.

These fijgitives, primarily indentured

servants or peasants, were turned in by citizens or apprehended by the state police in an
attempt to control social order. The insistence of Peter to regulate the population under
reforms, such as the "soul tax," imposed upon the agrarian sector to fund the state, and
the military established "Table of Ranks" that enforced service regardless of place in
society, created a significant influence on Russian development. Additionally, the Tsar
reinforced the notion of patrimonial dictatorship, resorting literally to beating those under
his command to induce conformity to his system. Peter's intent was to produce a strictly
regimented society, a goal which he initiated but did not realize during his lifetime.
However, tfie Petrine notion of order produced a state system that deflected challenge and
a mentality that compliance was the best course of action if one wanted to avoid
pimishment.
Even as Russia yielded to the primary objective of militarization, the Tsar had
introduced European culture and customs to his nation which diOused tiie idea of St.
Petersburg solely as a fortress. Particularly, by the time Catherine Ihe Great (1762-96)
completed her bid for power in 1762, Russia was indeed responding to the Enlightenment
ideas from Europe.^'* The Empress was instrumental in promoting cultural thought
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among the Russian bureaucrats, indulging her own taste for theatre productions by
writing plays and engaging the French philosophes, Voltaire and Diderot, in her courts.
Catherine's reign saw the legislation of printing presses throughout Russia, with the
provision that police were to be notified as to content of the publications. In 1794 the
Academy of Arts was founded in St. Petersburg, contributing to cultural development for
elite classes. Additionally, Catherine authorized scholars to travel to Europe and pursue
education at foreign institutions. Yet, as de Madariaga contends, Ihe 1790's represent
the parting of the ways between the government and the intellectuals of Russia .. .flie
intelligentsia."" Such divisions in Russian society marked the defining point when
philosophies and trends of thought emerged fi'om the educated population only to be
crushed by the political authority.
According to de Madariaga, the split between flie state and the intelligentsia occurred
for several reasons, but most notably as a result of the Empress's growing intolerance of
radical thinking and a cultural diQiision found in society that had not existed before
educational facilities were founded. Arguably, the French Revolution of 1789 was the
most influential event for Catiierine, alerting the Empress to the possibility of
insxirrection and rebeUion in Russia. The once powerful European monarchy came imder
challenge by a rising opposition. Therefore, Catherine began a regressive poUcy
concerning the censorship of publications, hoping to avoid a similar fate in her own
empire.
The plight of opposition to the Russian monarchy began with Alexander Radishchev
who was educated in Leipzig and worked in the Senate and the military. When he
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published A Joumev from St. Petersburg to Moscow in 1790, an account of the
oppressive conditions that consiuned nearly the entire population of Russia, Radishchev
was arrested and, althou^ originally sentenced to execution, was ultimately exiled.
Catherine resented Radishchev's claims that autocratic rule should be challenged by the
moral authority of society. Under such conditions the Tsarina refused to tolerate
dissension from the established order, a position that was beneficial for the ruler but not
for the ruled. Denying the privilege of communication throu^ publication led to a
breakdown between Catiierine and her subjects, a trend that developed the revolutionary
attitudes of tiie next century.
The increasing dictatorial position of the Tsarist regime, with regard to
communication, initiated a social behavior that failed to mature to a productive and
respected force, but instead languished in fits and starts of revolutionary fervor which
resulted in fiirflier social dysfunction. Radishchev describes the situation in Journey:
Censorship has become the nursemaid of reason, wit, and imagination, of
everything great and enli^tened. But where there are nurses, there are babies
and leading strings, which often lead to deformed legs; where there are guardians,
there are minors and immature minds unable to take care of themselves. If there
are always to be nurses and guardians, then the child will walk with leading
strings for a long time and will grow up to be a cripple... Everywhere these are
the consequences of the usual censorship, and the sterner it is, tfie more disastrous
are its consequences.^®
Jesse V. Clardy evaluates Radishchev's position as one which urges freedom of thought
and the right to expression. Without such fundamental truths the society will learn
nothing more than concession to authority, and the authority will only become less
receptive to the formation of different trends of thought and expression in the interest of
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guarding its power. De Madariaga's analysis of Catherine's reign emphasizes her
reluctance to allow the nobility political discussion even though the nobles were liberated
far more under Catherine than imder any of her predecessors.'^ The effects of forei^
revolt no doubt played an influential role in prohibiting progressive communication
among society, but the atrocities committed by the revolutionary opposition in France
contributed to Russia's desire to distance itself from European affairs.
The emergence of the Russian intelligentsia during the reign of Catherine the Great
created tension in the autocracy, demonstrated throu^out the 19^ century until the final
rule of Nicholas n(1892-1917). The fluctuating policies that allowed for a minimum of
political interaction only fueled shaiper criticism among the service gentty, the new
classification of citizens who possessed nobility heritage. According to Andrzej WaUcki,
the liberalization of the gentiy class gathered momentum, particularly during the reign of
Alexander n(1855-81), which witnessed growing dissension from the political power in
tiie form of oiganizations of opposition. In order to build a consensus of thought among
the radical opposition, a growing segment of the intelligentsia promoted ideas by
publishing articles expounding on social change designed to promote balanced
government and facilitate modernization. As Walicki stresses, the years following the
reign of Nicholas I(1825-55) produced "high-minded optimism and national harmony"
but culminated in the enforcement of political allegiance following the assassination of
Alexander n in 1881.
Nicholas Chemyshevsky, one of the sixties radicals, authored during his incarceration
What Is To Be Done? in which he expands on his philosophy concerning necessity and

" Isabel De Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short History (London: New Haven Press, 1990).

24

the historical evolution of life. Walicki notes that Chemyshevsky's chief observation
was "the greatest evil in Russia was autocracy—which because of censorship he was
obliged to refer to as 'bureaucracy.Despite Chemyshevsky's imprisonment, his book
escaped pubhcation censorship and received popular acclaim fliroughout Russia,
becoming one of the literary inspirations of Vladimir Dyich LeniiL^' However, while the
impetus for social progress required intellect and ideas put into words, in Russia the force
for change was weak.
W. Bruce Lincoln argues that, precisely at tiie time enlightened thinking came to
Russia by the middle of the 19'*' century, the number of people able to participate in a
discussion concerning reform was minute. The percentage of gentry stood in small
contrast to the majority of peasants, and there existed no poUtical body to interact with
the autocracy on behalf of society. The lack of distributive power both in economics and
intellectual education allowed neither for reform nor modernization because those who
participated did so according to a single standard of power. Lincoln explains the
situation:
Russia lacked any national consultative or legislative body, for such was
inconsistent with the premises upon which autocracy.. .had been based. At the
same time rigid censorship meant that public commentary about her pressing
problems remained impossible.... A course flius had to be found that would
preserve autocracy and its traditional instruments but, at the same time, allow
Rvissia to reenter the competition with Europe. . .Russia's economy—especially
her industry—^must develop as had that of Europe and her social order must be
adjusted to meet the needs that reasonably stemmed from that course of action.^"
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The bureaucratic administration and society required participation in the reform
process, yet Alexander n was as jealous of power as all of his predecessors had been and
granted fractional liberty. The complexities of economic and social development
demanded distribution of power, not only in administration but intellectually.
Li 1861 the Tsar abolished serfdom in Russia in response to growing sentiment among
flie intelligentsia for emancipation. Emancipation of the serfs revolved around economic
issues which became increasingly worrisome to national stability. Nineteenth-century
Europe had moved toward uibanizaticm and industrialized economies, but Russia's
agrarian population remained mired under legislation that prohibited mobility. Alexander

n's emancipation refoitns were burdened by his determination to preserve the status quo
in the political and social arenas. While serfdom formally ended, the continuing
autocratic government was not conducive to progressive action economically or socially.
Lincoln contends that Alexander n reacted to European expressions of power, ideological
and economic, as a threat to the national identity of Russia as epitomized in the words of
S.S. Uvarov: "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality."^^ However, there were terms
such as glasnost tiiat began to circulate among the Russian enlightened circles.
According to Lincoln, the term glasnost was coined in the middle of the 19^ century
to define the bridge between the public and the government Specifically glasnost
referred to information that went public and was used in conjunction with the term
zakonnost, or lawfulness. As Lincoln points out, the imderstanding in Russia of public
information and lawfulness amoimts to a narrow definition that suggests the public must
comply with the government when dispensing information through dialogue or in
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literature or other modes of expressi(»L Ultimately the notion of glasnost was to
involve the society but only insofar as that involvement did not contradict the dictates of
the law. Such a twist on participation is especially difficult for Western ideologists to
comprehend, and in fact Lincoln e;q)lains that die enlightened Russian bureaucrats
struggled to reconcile the standard of law with autocratic power and to understand the
purpose of glasnost. Lincoln's analysis of the meaning given to glasnost is si^orted by
censor V.A. Tsie who wrote in 1856:
It is necessary to note that, with the expansion of [administrative] authority [on
tiie local level], it is essential to resort to a single device, namely glasnost', in
order to retain it within lawful limits. This is the most reliable, one can say the
the only, means for ensuring that the beneficial plans of the central government
will not become a dead letter but will become fully beneficial in their
consequences. .. .Nowhere does glasnost' have such a fundamental and
undoubted utility as in legal proceedings.. .It provides the oppressed the
opportunity to enjoy the protection of the law, and it alone, with its all-shattering
power, can shake and finally eradicate the most shameful ulcer of our country—
corruption.
Many enlightened members of the Russian bureaucracy saw the promise of glasnost,
including Prince Petr Dolgorukov, described by Lincoln as "a controversial and
tempestuous figure during the first years of Alexander U's reign,"^^ and Alexander
Herzen who was also a supporter of reformist efforts, hi 1860, O.A. Przhetslavskii of the
Censorship Administration wrote On Glasnost'in Russian Journalistic Literature which
defined the term glasnost as contraiy to the designs of Russian politics. According to
Przehetslavskii, glasnost "does not conform to our civic order, the peculiarities of our
national character, the level of our present development, or our future requirements."^
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The definition became Russia's standard of understanding glasnost, meaning
essentially that public opinion should conform to political authority.
Because glasnost was inextricably linked with the premise that lawfulness equated
autocratic govenunent, there was little motivation to pursue alternative defuoitions which
mi^t reach dijBFerent outcomes. The single-mindedness of principle in glasnost's
definition was imique to the Russian perception and, as such, presented few controversial
perspectives among the inteUigentsia. Unity of thou^t and piupose was the
underpinning of the Russian government, established and maintained through resolute
acceptance of the autocratic order. Entertaining different approaches to the estabUshed
law could only be achieved in Russia by radical dissent because there existed no legal
means of challenging the authority.

The Revolution and Perfection of Autocratic Rule
The prelude to the Bolshevik Revolution began with careful thou^t and preparation
on the part of Vladimir I. Ulyanov, later known as Lenin. In addition to the revolutionaiy
direction supplied by Lenin other factors contributing to the Bolshevik Revolution of
1917 were a Tsarist ruler with no progressive intentions, a fhistrated intelligentsia that
rallied together, and a massive population that was overshadowed by the Bolshevik's new
leadership objectives. In point of fact the most instrumental factor contributing to the
collapse of the Tsarist regime was leadership because under Lenin, the Bolshevik Party
siqjplied a viable opposition to conduct the revolution.
However, in reviewing the outcome of the Russian Revolution history presents a grim
picture of dictatorship that repressed and tortured the very citizens it claimed to defend.
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The established Union of Soviet Socialist Republics evolved to become an
industrialized nation led by a militarized regime. The Soviet population of workers fell
into one of two categories, either as an industrial or agricultural worker, or as a member
of the militaiy whose job it was to defend the state interests. What is most interesting
about such an arrangement is who exactly was defending the interests of the workers?
According to Gorbachev's interpretation, the worker population became the "state
enemy" if they disagreed with socioeconomic or pohtical policies. Therefore the concept
of the "enemies of the people" literally translated into tiie society being against the state,
a consequence that rendered the peculation helpless to challenge state authority.
The most infamous of the Party's repressors, Joseph Stahn, succeeded in the Soviet
industrialization. He was also pubUcly denounced and ostracized by Nikita Khrushchev
in 1956 at the de-Stalinization speech, an event which triggered the process known as the
"Thaw" in the post-Stalin years. Stalinization left deeper scars in the Soviet society and
made a far larger impact on Soviet identity and progress than any of the effects of
industrialization. Former General of the Commimist Party, Dmitri Volkogonov,
summarizes Stalin's contribution to the Soviet Union as blatant "lawlessness and
totalitarianism" and characterizes Stalin as a man with no conscience.
Khrushchev's bold condemnation of Stalin broke through important social barriers in
the Soviet Union, allowing for the emergence of critical thinking, even if at a very
superficial level. The documentation Khrushchev had obtained from P. N. Pospelov,
editor of Pravda, pointed to fabrication and injiistice committed by Party officials against
other Party ofiQcials, rank and file members, as well as millions of Soviet citizens. The
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release of information proved to be as damaging to &e Soviet identity as to the leader
who committed crimes against his own citizenry. Khrushchev responded by beginning
the massive military build-up against alleged American imperialism, hoping that
competition on an international scale would boost Soviet morale and redefine national
purpose. Volkogonov credits Khrushchev with inadvertently beginning "new thinking"
even though his leadership was short-lived due to the inability of the Party to comprehend
the seriousness of Stalin's legacy.
However, there is a legacy that beccnnes far more influential than Stalinism. Lenin, as
the front-runner of the intelligentsia responsible for organizing opposition politics in
Russia, created the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Harold Shukman, the editor of
Volkogonov's latest publication which deals exclusively with Lenin, describes the
founder of the Soviet Union as follows:
From its inception to its end the Soviet state was identified wilh Lenin, whether
alive or dead. Without him, it is generally accepted, there would have been no
October revolution. . .He was made into an icon, a totem of ideological purity and
guidance beyond questioning.^®
Shukman goes on to e^qilain that Lenin "remained untouched" after Stalin was implicated
in Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress. What was it about Lenin's
rtQ'stique which held generation after generation captive to the socialist ideal for over
seven decades? Volkogonov argues that it was Lenin who created tiie Conmiunist Party
with all of its notorious injustices, injustices which have been assigned to Stalin as die
monster dictator of the regime. The argument has gained popular recognition only since
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dethroning of the Party in 1991. Still, the
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question remains one of the peculiar enigmas liiat trouble Soviet and Western scholars
about Russian history and politics.
Volkogonov's conclusions are that Leninism virtually castrated the Russian nation by
wresting any hope of democratic socialism from the Provisional Giovemment of the 1917
February revolution. Perhaps Lenin's socialist vision suffered because of the crippled
socioeconomic conditions already present under the Tsarist system, however the
transition proved to be inadequate as a socialist democracy. Before the Bolshevik Party
had been oiganized, Lenin began his education from the intelligentsia of the 19^ centmy
courts. Nicholas Chemyshevsky challenged liberalism to be inadequate in progressive
change when applied to the economic and historical development of nations.
Chemyshevsky advocated measures and is described by Nikolai Valentinov as "the
generally acknowledged leader of tiie Russian revolutionary current.

Ascribed to

Chemyshevsky is Lenin's rejection of the liberal perspective primarily because liberalism
advocated Westem political procedure. Consequently, Lenin's position led to his
embrace of revolutionary politics in pursuit of Populism which emerged in the mid1800's as an ideology promoting societal involvement. However, the intelligentsia
literature was not the only influence on Lenin. According to the popular mythology
about Lenin, the execution of his brother Alexander in 1887 as a result of the planned
assassination on Alexander m fueled the determinism in Lenin to continue in the
footsteps of the revolutionary, and overthrow the Tsarist government.
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In Russia, terrorism was acknowledged to be the only possible challenge to a
centuries old autocracy that ^eatened to drag on for eternity. For Lenin revolution was
both ends and means. Valentinov comments that, although Alexander Ulyanov and his
yoimger brother Vladinfiir were both revolutionaries, the di£ference between them was a
question of morality. It is difficult to evaluate the perspectives held by Alexander
because of his execution at the age of 21 years, but Valentinov suggests that Lenin's elder
brother retained an idealistic faith in humanity and that Lenin had not the disposition or
the faith of his brother, instead relying on more aggressive actions.
Revolution in Europe had redefined governments. Lenin was influenced by the French
revolution which had happened a fiiU century earlier but which left deep impressions as
to the power capable in revolution. Although Lenin immersed himself in literature from
Marx and Chemyshevsky, he developed his own personal ideals of political objectives
and how to achieve them. The Leninist ideology subscribed to one definition of morality:
" 'Whatever serves Communism is moral.For Lenin the goal of securing political
power in Russia involved revolutionary metiiods, as outlined by Chemyshevsky and
suggested by Marx. However, according to Volkogonov, Lenin completely disregarded
the e^lier hiunanist writings of Marx, preferring to resort to any means to one end.
Volkogonov describes Lenin's intentions in this way:
After his return to Russia on 16 April 1917, when he was whipping iq) a mood of
frenzy, harnessing ^e masses' impatience, promising peace and land in exchange
for support for his Party, Lenin bent every effort to turn that Party into a combat
organization, capable of seizing power. . .This had nothing to do with socialism.
The society which Lenin and his adherents began to build had to resort to
tuirestrained violence, in accordance with the leader's views, in order to survive.
As the highest principle of revolutionary development, the dictatorship trampled
and subordinated everything to its own will. Having once espoused the idea of
Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography 28.
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socialism in one countiy, Lenin pushed questions of morality well down the
Bolshevik agenda.
The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 was led by the radical revolutionary Lenin,
who saw revolution in Russia as a struggle for political power, nationally and
internationally. Ultimately the needs of the society were not only compromised but
violated.
An example is found in Volkogonov's research which includes an authorization by tiie
Party in 1919 to liquidate jewelry valued at millions of rubles in order to fimd the
Comintern, the Commimist Party's international branch for advancing communism. In
1921 the Party refused to allow the improvement of children's rations in the Soviet
Union. As Volkogonov comments, "difiRculties faced by the regime do not justify the
refusal to meet this need. While millions were cfying of hunger and disease, the Politi>uro
was lavishly disbursing tsarist gold to ignite revolution in other countries,"'® Such events
illustrate the priorities that Leninist principles held which are contradictory to socialist
democracy. Revolution for the cause imited Leninist followers in a strange assembly
known as the Communist Party. Lenin created the Party, but what did the Party hope to
accompUsh other than a continuous revolution? To wliat ends were Party members
devoted? As Volkogonov asks, "How can the dictatorship of one class—or more
accurately one Party—be reconciled with the principles of people's power, liberty and tiie
equaUty of all citizens?"'^ According to Volkogonov, the answer revolves aroimd the
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convoluted principles of Leninism that overthrew the Tsarist regime to implement a
new regime, the Communist Party.
Lenin established the Party to be the epicenter of the Soviet Union, unconditionally
and without accountability. The socialist revolution became the mantra of Leninist
ideals, but the rhetoric disguised the violence that accomp<uued Lenin's Bolshevik Party
to power. The Bolsheviks embraced violence in tiie interest of power. Volkogonov
describes the opposition faction called the Mensheviks as "the only true social
democrats."^^ Socialist democracy was aUen to the formation of the Commimist Party
primarily because Lenin declared himself a communist inl914, a position that technically
divorced Lenin and the Communist Party from aSiliation with the German Social
Democrats who approved of WWL Additionally, Lenin's earlier theory concerning
social democracy failed to take effect once the Bolsheviks gained political power. By the
Seventh Congress of 1918 flie Party officially took the title Communist Party of Russia.^^
The transition of power from the Tsarist Russia to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics became a reality in Lenin's lifetime. Still, the reality was not the benevolent
socioeconomic system tiiat Marx had discussed.
Revolution had won Lenin the poUtical authority he desired and fought for throu^out
his lifetime. Yet, the Communist Party failed to implement socialism or socialist
democracy because to do so would threaten the supremacy of the Party's political power.
The maintenance of the Party in a position of command meant the denial of liberty to
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society. The survival of the Party required total submission, without representation,
without elections, without question.
The Party never installed socialist or democratic institutions but instead inqilemented
its own unique institutions capable of maintaining political power and social control
Lenin had come to power throu^ revolutionary methods, and he knew that such avenues
were open to anyone who opposed Party rule. Lenin's genius was reserved to eliminating
the same options for revolt as he had selected. The first consequence was a massive
restriction placed on society that was enf(»x:ed through militia power. The Cheka, or
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage, institution
guaranteed allegiance to the Party. Founded in December 1917, the Cheka became the
secret political police, not unlike Ivan IV's Oprichnina, that was enqjowered by the use of
terror against the Soviet population, one of Lenin's favorite methods of rule.
Another institution founded by Lenin was the GULAG prison camps that performed
mass executions and abuses against political prisoners smd dissidents of the revolution.
The revolution was fueled by the forced imprisonment and labor of Soviet citizens at the
insistence of Cheka force. With the Cheka and the GULAGs in place Lenin coiild assure
the fiature course of Soviet power and the dominance of the Communist Party as the only
vanguard of the system. Lenin oi^anized terror in the formation of the Communist Party
in the single interest of political power.
Leninism embodied the socialist revolution in name only. The reality for Soviet
society was that the political power remained firmly in place over the economic needs or
social issues of the peasant workers and proletariat masses. The irony of such a situation
is that the socialist revolution became synonymous with Leninism as if he were the
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creator of some benevolent Utopian ideal in his name. Leninism was never socialist
democracy. However, Leninism was capable of masking reality with untruths, coercion,
repression, and fear because for over seven decades the Communist Party held political
power in Lenin's legacy of socialist revolution.
For men like Stalin, Khrushchev, Bre2imev, Andropov, and Gort>achev, Leninism
came in place of the national identity. Such a concept allowed institutions like the Cheka
to evolve into the KGB, or the Committee for State Security, with the sole purpose of
keeping the Communist Party in power. The most damaging aspect of all was the lack of
social participation in a government that sustained itself on the riietoric of the socialist
democratic ideology, consequently leading to hypocrisy. What Lenin created in the
militarized Soviet state his successors were left to maintain in any way they could. Over
the course of five decades, Stalin expanded the terrorist approach, Brezhnev ti^tened tiie
bureaucratic rule, and Khrushchev's ambiguous appeals for reform cost him his
leadership position. Andropov resorted to the usual reactionary politics that would
consolidate Party power and keep the population disempowered, exactly as Leninism had
initially done.
The order of the Parly continued to be the paramount objective by the time Gorbachev
ascended the ranks to become the seventh Soviet leader in March of 1985. Yet the Party
only had power within the borders of the Soviet Union. Lenin's socialist revolution had
not replaced capitalism or democracy, but instead created a bipolar existence in which the
Soviet system was rapidly loosing ground to the United States in a battle of military
might. More importantly, the Soviets were waging revolution against the democratic
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capitalism of the West, but the Leninist legacy failed to realize the socialist democracy
that it had espoused. Volkogonov explains:
The leadership could not accept that Soviet society was not merely mired in
stagnation, but also in a state of psychological disaffection and doubt about values
that had previously been universally accepted. The gap between what people said
in public and what they thoi^t was widening to the extent that it had become an
everyday fact of life. The public mood was like Lenin's physical condition after
10 March 1923. Leninism seemed on the surface to be alive, but it was incapable
of a single fresh idea.. .The Russian people had not yet understood that Leninism
was not amenable to reform, that cither it must remain what it had been for
decades, or be totally discarded.^
As Volkogonov argues, w^t evolved under Lenin's dictates was a political direction
completely antithetical to socialist democracy. Leninism developed as a result of the
Bolshevik revolution mentality that thrived on Lenin, constant revolution against a
constant enemy, both external and internal; by 1985 it was becoming increasingly harder
to maintain this idea in the status of the prevailing mentality.
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CHAPTER THREE
CLASH OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES

Gorbachev as Communist Parly Leader
The most interesting point which Volkogonov makes emphasizes the precarious
position tiiat Gorbachev inherited. Leninism was the Soviet national ideological identity
that had never been evaluated or challenged by the Party because Leninism, like the
Party, had to remain in a position of imdisputed power. When Gorbachev came into
power as the General Secretary he was a Party o£Eicial and devoted to the Leninist
ideology.
However, as General Secretary, Gorbachev reaUzed he had much to consider. The
Soviet Union was failing to compete at an international level in terms of economic and
technological development. Additionally, the Cold War was dragging out into its fourth
decade, sapping the military expenditures of both the U.S. and tiie U.S.S.R., but
particularly taxing the Soviet system. Initially, Gorbachev interpreted the lag in Soviet
economics as due to production inefficiencies in the system, a viewpoint en^)hasized by
Dusko Doder and Louise BransoiL According to Doder and Branson's analysis, the
Soviet system was no longer efficient, prompting Gorbachev to implement the reform of
perestroika as a restructuring of the system.
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The importance of Gorbachev's intentions to restructure a system that was, as
Volkogonov asserts, incapable of being restructured is paramount. The primary
contradiction rests in the fact that Gorbachev was absolutely in line with the MarxistLeninist ideals. As a young Soviet citizen Gorbachev lived in the collectivized
agricultural regions of Stavropol krai, or territoiy, farming with generations of his family.
Perfiaps because of Gorbachev's early association with the land and family he developed
an appreciation of the role of the Party in collectivized economics. The idea that
advantage could be secured if one were of strong constitution and pledged allegiance to
the Party was an indelible lesson to the peasant-worker populations that grew out of rural
territories such as Stavropol Although Gorbachev had the experience of fanning as a
young man, it was academics at which he would excel.
In 1955 Gorbachev graduated with a degree in law from the Moscow State University
where he was awarded the highest grade for writing a paper on "the demonstration of the
advantages of socialist democracy over bourgeois democracy."' After graduation
Gorbachev returned to Stavropol where he was appointed as an official at the Komsomol,
or Communist Youth League. Gorbachev proceeded to advance throu^ the ranks of the
Party, becoming second, then first secretary of the Stavropol province by 1970. As
Gorbachev received recognition and status in the nomenklatura, he succeeded in making
important governmental contacts, a necessity for Party members who desired to become
officials. At the same time Gorbachev was forging his political presence as a committed
and responsive administrator, the "Thaw" of the Khrushchev era was in progress. In
response to the torment and tyranny that had characterized Stalin's Soviet leadership,

' Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 44.
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Khrushchev delivered his de-Stalinization speech to the XXth Party Congress in 1956.
Attending his first Party Congress in the autumn of 1961, Gorbachev witnessed the
detiironing of Stalin's "personality cult" that literally removed statues and relocated
Stalin's gravesite at the Kremlin walL
According to Gorbachev's reflections on the "Thaw" and de-Stalinization campaign,
the crux of the problem existed in the Party apparatus, and not solely as a result of the
unsavory character of one Soviet leader. However, during the events of Ae early sixties,
Gorbachev raUied to the Party effort to minimize Stalin's legacy of teriOT because he was
as invested in Party politics as any of his comrades. The strategy to ensure survival
existed in eveiy strata of life throughout the Soviet Union, but nowhere did it thrive as
strongly than in the Communist Party.
Gorbachev's affiliation in the Party connected him to Yuri Andropov, also from flie
Stavropol region and the head of the KGB from 1967 to 1982. In such capacity
Andropov engaged in subversive crackdowns against political dissidents and participated
in the corruption of power involving the Party apparatus. In their account of Andropov's
role in the Party and the KGB, Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova suggest that
Andropov engaged in conspiratorial actions in order to raise Russian nationaUsm, largely
in response to the ineffective Brezhnev's propaganda. Solovyov and Klepikova describe
Brezhnev's eighteai years in power as follows:
He exhausted the country—^perhaps irreversibly. He brought agriculture, which
was already unprofitable, to the point of final collapse; he made the national
economy dependent upon foreign investments; he weakened the reins of
government within the country; he loosened the bonds of Eastern Europe;
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he retreated before America in such a key area as the Mddle East; and he
reduced the Soviet Union to the role of a second rate power.^
Andropov's succession to Bre^mev occurred, according to Solovyov and Klepikova, as a
resuh of long-established patterns of opportunism acquired from his years in the KGB
and due to the lack of progressive vision. Once Andropov took o£5ce in the Kremlin his
objectives were to "return to Stalinist-type labor legislation,"^ an iq)proach involving
criminal indictment followed by discipline procedures.
It is important to establish Andropov's position in the Party to illustrate the influence
he had on Gorbachev. Andropov's education was minor, comparatively on the same
level as Stalin's, while Gorbachev was academically accomplished. Consequently,
Andropov's reaction to the situation inherited from Brezhnev was to turn away from
ideology and tighten the police state in order to motivate economics. At the time
Solovyov and Klepikova published their volume on Andropov in 1983, Gorbachev
remained one of the "new class" Party officials, as many of his colleagues who came
from outlying provinces and were consequently imtainted by Moscow politics.
However, Gorbachev's evaluation of the state of the Soviet system mirrors closely
Andropov's. According to Solovyov and Klepikova, Andropov's concept of crime
ranged from "alcoholism, petty hooliganism, parasitism, absenteeism, the theft of
govermnent property, bribery, nepotism, corruption," * and political dissent. Upon taking
office in 1985, Gorbachev attributed the sluggish economic situation in the nation to the
same social ills as Andropov established. Unlike Andropov, Gorbachev rejected the

^ Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, Yuri Andropov (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1983), 277.
^Ibid., 281.
" Ibid., 283.
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approach of increased coercion and discipline to force compliance to the system, as
evidenced by his speech dehvered at the seventieth anniversaiy celebration of the
October Revolution in 1987.
The speech illustrates Gorbachev's decision to increase ideological awareness in tiie
Soviet Union, specifically the Leninist ideal that created the Soviet nation. It is important
to note that, throughout his speech, Gorbachev did not refer to tiie national ideology as
communist, but Leninist Such a distinction is critical to understanding Gorbachev's
position in the Party. Gorbachev's decision to use Leninism as the preferred course of
thought and practice in the nation demonstrates his departure from Andropov's ^)proach.
Moreover, for Grorbachev, Leninism embodied the spirit of the Soviet Union. Doder and
Branson describe Gorbachev as a dedicated Marxist-Leninist, committed to the political
structure of a one Party system and to socialism as the answer for socioeconomic
advantage. Indeed, in his speech and in his volume Perestroika. piiblished two years after
he became General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev does speak with conviction aboiit
the Leninist ideal and socialist democracy.
Particularly in Perestroika. Gorbachev presents himself as a man with a vision, in
much the same way Lenin did in his publications before the Bolshevik revolution.
Although it cannot be asserted that Gorbachev was appealing to the nation by invoking
Leninism, the rallying message certainly is primary throughout the book. One particular
section is entitled "Perestroika is a Revolution" which comments:
I think we had every reason to declare at the Januaiy 1987 Plenary Meeting: in its
essence, in its Bolshevik daring and in its humane social thrust the present course
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is a direct sequel to the great accomplishments started by the Leninist Party in
tiie October days of 1917.^
Although Gorbachev declines to equate perestroika with the October revolution, his
intention to link Leninism with perestroika as a revolutionaiy process is undeniable.
Volkogonov comments that Gorbachev "declared with conviction that 'a bridge must be
thrown from Lenin, connecting Lenin's ideas and Lenin's approach to the events of his
time to the affairs of today '"® Conceivably Gorbachev's Leninist approach to refonn
allowed him to demonstrate his loyalty to die Party while appealing to the masses to build
socialism in the revolutionary manner of 1917.
In addition, Gorbachev's return to the Leninist ideal allowed him to connect
perestroika wifli the New Economic Policy that was begun xmder Lenin in March of
1921. Perestroika was characterized by Gtjrbachev as a restructuring of the economics of
the Soviet Union. As did many of his predecessors, Gorbachev showcased economic
restructuring as reform for the nation. Beginning with NEP, the Soviets began a cycle of
economic reform that would allow the Party to appear in charge of building the socialist
society. According to Gorbachev, it was Lenin that created and implemented NEP, going
so far in his seventieth anniversary speech to discredit Nikolai Bukharin in favor of Lenin
with regard to flie NEP policy. However, Volkogonov sharply contradicts Gorbachev's
defense by asserting:
Nor did we reaUze that the NEP was not an economic strategy, but merely a
tactical maneuver forced on Lenin by Ihe devastating collapse of the genuinely
Leninist policy of War Communism. Lenin, far from being the initiator of NEP,
was in fact its long-time foe.^
^ Mikhail S.Gorbachev, Perestroika: New TTiinking for Our Country and the World (New York; Harper &
Row Publishers, 1987), 50.
® Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin; A New Biography (New York; The Free Press, 1994), 477
'' Ibid., 478.
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Considering Gorbachev's position in the Party as leader of economic reform, it was to
his benefit to link Lenin with NEP and then to perestroika. In such capacity he could
appeal to both the Party and to tiie public to support perestroika, as a revolutionary cause
with a distinctive nationalistic flavor.
The previous economic policies that were implemented in the Soviet Union had
consistently focussed on Party planning under the bureaucratic structure of Gosplan,
started in 1921 in conjimction with >JEP. Plotting Five-Year Plans was invariably the
responsibility of Gosplan, as the state planning committee, but the plans were not
progressive enough to make the nation competitive with the global economy. Acceding
to Shane, the Soviet Union was accustomed to taking second place behind the U.S. in
terms of technological development but when "certain Asian countries, toward which
they had always felt a patronizing superiority"* surpassed tiie Soviets, tiie modernization
of their economics became urgent.
An important consideration of Gorbachev's perestroika reform is that the primary
intention was to rejuvenate the economic situation, a traditional albeit innovative action.
Gorbachev's initial reform was termed "acceleration," designed to increase rapidly
economic development. However, acceleration was a short-lived slogan that produced
only more brainstorming to fix the pressing issues of economic stagnation.
According to Gorbachev, perestroika was mainly concerned with economic
restructuring and political restructuring to flie degree that the Party should be

® Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Infonnation Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
Publisher, 1994), 69.
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strengthened by accountability to perestroika. Gorbachev's Party logic is evident in his
publication on perestroika that emphasizes repeatedly the authority of the Parly in leading
&e social order to economic progress.^ Doder and Branson's account illiistrates
Gorbachev's intent was "to change the nature of the Communist Party without
endangering its primacy

However, he began to sense the urgency was not about

economic acceleration but rather the factor of accoimtability.
Doder and Branson chronicle the process of perestroika noting that, in 1986 wlien
Gorbachev spoke in terms of democratization in the Soviet Union, he was candid about
the lack of "opposition" in the Party By the following year he admitted that the nation
had not experienced democratic traditions but expressed the hope that "we have to search
for truth together."^^ Grorbachev's reform glasnost was presented after perestroika, as a
secondary initiative because the evidence that perestroika had not invigorated economics
was apparent by 1986. As explained by Doder and Branson, Gorbachev's realization that
perestroika was not motivating the Party to efifect change in the political sphere meant
^t he had to appeal to the masses. It is of particular importance to understand that
Gorbachev evaluated glasnost as a way to enlist support for perestroika with the sole
objective being the rejuvenation of economics. If he could not count on the Party for
support he would use glasnost to stimulate the people to support perestroika.

' Groibachev, Perestroika.
Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Penguin Books,

1990), 77
" Ibid.
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The very idea of a Soviet leader relying on the people and not the Party to effect
change was a move toward democratization. For decades the Party's Central Committee
directed every area of life in the Soviet Union without any legitimate democratic
participation from the people. Glasnost allowed the openness necessaiy to advance
perestroika, an approach Gorbachev describes in Memoirs:
It was obvious that the poUcy of perestroika was seen by many as just another
campaign, which would soon run out of steam. We had to eliminate doubts of
this kind and convince people of the need for the new course, and so the theme of
glasnost -'transparency'- came up in the report. 'Democracy does not and cannot
exist without glasnost.'
Gorbachev's appeal to the Soviet population was that they were now legitimately
involved in his reform process and, consequently, in the political processes of the nation.
Grorbachev's recognition of the democratization factor that glasnost provided was
genuine, as evidenced in his book, yet tiie critical turning point revolved aroxmd his
interpretation of democratization.

Gorbachev's Democratic Reforni Glasnost
It is essential to imderstand how Gorbachev interpreted glasnost's objective,
democratization through openness, to comprehend fully why, after more than seven
decades, a Soviet leader of a communist supeipower would embrace democracy in
reform. Perhaps, one of the key points can be found in W. Bruce Lincoln's analysis
involving glasnost in the courts of Alexander II. According to Lincoln, glasnost meant an

Gorbachev, Memoirs. 195.
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eradication of those characteristics that lead to corruption in government Glasnost was
set forth for the definite objective of advancing politics, as explained by Prince Petr
Dolgorukov in 1857 when he decried corruption in the administration 2md advocated
openness to expel such tendencies;
Without the broad development of glasnost' the government will never have the
opportunity to recognize all the abuses [in its administration] and thus will never
have the opportunity to eradicate Ihem... .Glasnost' is the best physician for the
ulcers of the state.... A wise use of glasnost' is the best weapon for destroying
false rumors, secret schemes, absurd and evil hearsay. By permitting all civic
interest groups to express themselves openly, but peacefully and properly, the
government will give peaceful and calm expression to all legal demands. A
reasonable and proper discussion of various questions will supply the government
with informatimi about the needs and requirements of Russia.^
Dolgorukov's appeal mirrors Gorbachev's in that both men urge openness in the society
as a way to enforce accountability in the government. Particularly, Lincoln assesses
Dolgorukov's position on glasnost to '"become the mortar to bind Tsar, educated opinion,
and the masses into an invincible force that could overcome all reactionary sentiment and
all self-interested opposition to reform in Russia."

The defining feature of glasnost in

the IP"* century was as a way to engage pubUc sentiment according to lawfulness. Such
an analysis extends easily to Gorbachev's glasnost approach more tiian century later.
In his book Perestroika. published at the beginning of his reform campaign,
Gorbachev invokes the use of glasnost, but only marginally and specifically in support of
the perestroika objectives. In ui^g glasnost, Gorbachev remarks in his book;
We have begun drafting bills fliat should gu^antee glasnost These bills are
designed to ensure the greatest possible openness in the work of government and

W Bruce Lincoln, In the Vangxiard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats. 1825-1861 (DeKalb,
Illinois: Northern University Press, 1982), 185.
" Ibid.
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mass oiiganizations and to enable working people to e?^)ress Hieir opinion on
any issue of social life and government activity without fear.^^
In calling for democratic reform Gorbachev is careful to align glasnost witti the proper
objectives, that of a socialist state. The reconciliation is difficult for the Western
perspective primarily because glasnost, implying democratization through
participation, seems predisposed to challenge the Soviet system, not to conform to it.
However, it is important to gain the Russian, and therefore Soviet, perspective, which
leads back to Lincoln's conclusions regarding glasnost
Gorbachev is consistent in connecting glasnost, democracy, and socialism Ihrou^out
Perestroika. establishing glasnost as the impetus for bringing democracy to improve
socialism, ttierefore ensuring the success of perestroika. Gorbachev's claims that "[u]pon
the success of perestroika depends the future of socialism," and only five paragraphs later
contends, "Soviet people are convinced that as a result of perestroika and democratization
the country will become richer and stronger."^® Gorbachev's desire to unite socialism
and democratization Ihrou^ glasnost is clearly stated in Perestroika. yet for all his good
intentions Gorbachev's vision was flawed.
Primarily, Gorbachev could not inspire both democratization and the strengthening of
socialism in a nation ^at never enjoyed democracy or socialism. With regard to
democratization, Gorbachev admits that the Soviets were "going through a school of
democracy again. We are learning. We lack political culture."^^ The principles of
democracy had been a fundamental topic to the Soviets since Lenin assembled his
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revolutionary forces, yet, as Volkogonov argues, "it is difficult to understand what
Lenin meant by democracy."

It becomes no less difficult a task to understand what

Gorbachev meant by democracy.
At the start of his book Gorbachev states that "according to Lenin, socialism and
democracy are indivisible." However, Gorbachev goes on to enqihasize the
importance of "expanding democracy.. .[to] unfold the entire potential of democracy."^'
Additionally, Gorbachev sets up socialism as the desired outcome for his nation, calling
for "more socialism and therefore, more democracy."^" For Gorbachev, socialism and
democracy were also indivisible but not as a unified socialist democratic order.
Gorbachev evaluated democracy as &e means to achieving tiie socialism end.
Democracy was an independent factor in die rush to strengthen socialism in the Soviet
Union, a position ttvat becomes apparent in the way Gorbachev uses both terms.
Socialism aid democracy are used independently throughout Ihe majority of his writing,
establishing his conviction that socialism was the system of choice and democracy was
only necessary to the finite degree of obtaining such a system
The premise that Gorbachev viewed democracy as a means to a greater end carries
over to the glasnost reform. For Gorbachev, glasnost meant an opportunity to enlist the
participation of society in a single objective. His strategy to involve the population was
well intentioned yet, "[a]s an empiricist, who treated ideas primarily as tools of practical
judgement,"^^ he failed to realize the power that intangible ideas and Noughts are
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capable of. The inherent contradiction involving glasnost was that Gori)achev
perceived reform as one-dimensional, as evidenced in his insistence ^t one goal must be
achieved:
Li my opinion, any honest, open talk, even if it arouse doubts, should be
welcomed. But if you try to fit somebody else's suit on us, beware! Glasnost is
aimed at strengthening our society. . .Only those whom socialist democracy and
our demands for responsibility prevent from satisfying their personal ambitions,
which are, anyway, far removed from the people's interest, can doubt this.^^
The primacy of socialism is also parent by the way Gorbachev literally places the
socialist term ahead of democracy in his speeches and writing. Such indicators reveal the
major importance in Gorbachev's reform to be socialism, a position that, according to
Shane, legitimately characterized Gorbachev.
Democracy throu^ glasnost was a secondary factor in Gorbachev's reforms because
democracy never existed in either Russia or flie Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev
embraced glasnost in the reform process, referring to glasnost as providing more truth
and light, he did not conceive of glasnost as potentially threatening to the reform
objective of socialism. To the contrary, Gorbachev considered glasnost as in line with
the Party directives, otherwise he would have never called for such a reform.
The task of comprehending what Gorbachev had in mind when he urged a democratic
reform to achieve a single objective becomes complicated due to the socialist standard
that Gorbachev was influenced by throughout his life. In the Soviet Union, as so many
scholars and authors have argued, democratic socialism was never accomplished with the
Bolshevik Revolution. Consequently, Gorbachev's ideal of democratic society or
socialism witti a democratic flavor, was never groimded in juiything tiiat had previously
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existed in reality. Therefore, the Soviet leader legitimately struck out in a different
direction when he called for democratization in his country. The pivotal point was that
gilasnost epitomized democracy, especially due to Gorbachev's definition, but the Soviet
leader refused to concede that glasnost would effect anything other than restructuring the
Party in terms of making it less corrupt and more efficient as the vanguard of the working
population. In achieving this particular objective Gorbachev felt that more public
participation was required in directing Hie economic and political course of the nation to
fulfill the true socialist goals put forth by Marxist/Leninist ideals. The refinement of
Marxism-Leninism led Gorbachev to encourage public interaction with the political
authority of the Party
According to Gorbachev's prescribed course of action, glasnost was to free public
communication to benefit &e goals of tiie Party in redirecting tiie economic structure.
Specifically, glasnost would allow tiie liberty to conununicate within media forms such
as radio and television broadcasts, news and magazine publications, and public forums of
discussion. Such venues provided, according to Gorbachev, the perfect opportunity to
advance socialism.
Glasnost would cany the message of socialism to the masses and inspire them to
contribute to the cause in the spirit of a true workers government. Gorbachev believed in
the power of glasnost to democratize the Soviet Union, but under his terms. His
convictions are prevalent throughout his writing in which he calls for truA, light, and
sincere commimication, citing glasnost as "a vivid example of a normal and favorable
atmosphere in society."" Gorbachev's support for glasnost is evident as he urges a return
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of consciousness to the population yet the restrictive overtones in his words cannot be
escaped.
As Shane observes, Gorbachev was the quintessential communist, dedicated to the
Marxist-Leninist ideal As a result, Gorbachev "operated.. .inside the Soviet illusion,""
a position that afforded only restricted viewpoints. Sigiiificantly, Shane e?q>lains that
Lenin too was heartened by flie possibility of radio broadcasting in the Soviet Union at
the beginning of tiie twentieth-century but only to promote Soviet propaganda and
combat the opposition. Lenin was very aware of the power of the press. As flie foimder
of his newspaper Iskra. or "The Spark," in 1900, Lenin used words to fuel the Bolshevik
revolution. However, once accomplished, Lenin promptly dismissed the idea of
information from media sources made available to the population, because his ideological
judgment and method of government could not afford to be challenged.
For Gorbachev, acceptance of the Leninist principles was inbred. Gorbachev, like
Lenin, did not fathom the necessity to challenge the Soviet system. Glasnost was
therefore only to stimulate thou^t along the same channels of the accepted train of
tiiou^t.

Gorbachev clung to Lenin throu^out the entire reform process, depending on

the image of the Communist icon to shore support for glasnost As if Lenin were the
essence of democracy, Gorbachev relied on every aspect of Leninism to give credibility
to glasnost Doder and Branson point out that glasnost, as a term, became particularly
valuable to the reform process when researchers discovered Lenin had used the word
twenty-three times.

The most critical point is that Gorbachev believed glasnost would
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develop socialism along the lines of Leninism and in so doing create a stronger more
eJSicient socialism because he also believed lhat goal to be correct.

Why "New Thinking" Was Incompatible With The "Old Party"
Characterizing glasnost as a democratic reform capable of resurrecting the stagnant
economics and the weaiy Soviet population, Gorbachev set about implementing glasnost.
It is of particular interest that he referred to the legislation of glasnost as some type of
benevolent release of communication controls in die pursuit of truth. Perhaps his
underestimation of the power of glasnost was not so much attributed to his lack of
democratic experience as to his unyielding expectation.
Attenq)ting to set a personal example of openness, Gorbachev adopted the slogan of
"new thinking" to define his intentions for the Soviet nation and its place internationally.
It cannot be argued that Gorbachev's first priority was the improvement of the economic
system, particularly in achieving an improved position in the global economy. However,
Gorbachev's concern was also the improvement of the image of Soviets, domestically
and globally. Much of his writing reiterates the "glorious revolution," and expounds on
the greatness of Lenin. The pragmatic politician neglected to imderstand that thinkii^
cannot be confined to a single thought nor directed to a single goal, especially when
dealing with a nation of multiethnic peoples all e:!q)eriencing a diverse array of history
and culture.
Gorbachev preferred to bask in the success of the Bolshevik revolution, pretending
that everyone in the Soviet Union idoUzed Lenin and the Party equally. Calling for trutii
througji glasnost, Gorbachev expressed the hope tiiat society would support the Party, a
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mentality that is consistent throu^ Perestroika. as he continues to place the Party at the
center of government and the society as spectators. Commenting on the importance of
truth Gorbachev e;q)lains;
Truth is the main thing. Lenin said; More light! Let the Party know everything..
. .[t]he Party wants every citizen to voice his opinion confidently.... [w]e have
been drafting bills that should guarantee glasnost^
Unity of voice was Gorbachev's hope for ^asnost, and he encouraged truth sincerely
toward the socialist principle. As allowed by Gorbachev and the Party, glasnost provided
truth and inspired new thinking.
The media responded rapidly to glasnost with a burst of competitive energy. Anxious
to release information so long silenced under the Party's authority, news broadcasts
expanded their format to include as much information as possible during the allotted
time. According to Shane, television news programs cau^t the biggest share of viewing
audiences primarily because teleA^sion was flie most efficient means of providing
information. Television was capable of influencing millions of viewers, a fact that was
never lost on Gorbachev who saw television as a productive political forum.
As Gorbachev correctly surmised, content was the decisive issue. Unfortunately tiie
content that was presented across the airwaves on programs like V^lvad- or View, and
featured in news pubUcations as Moscow News and Ogonvok captured attention as never
before. Shane states that;
The unveiling of Stalinism had helped drive circulations of the boldest
pubUcations to unheard-of heists; between 1985 and 1989, for instance,
Ogonvok's subscribers had quintupled, from 596,000 to 3 million and climbing.
Komsomolskava Pravda. the lively national youth newspaper, reached 20 miUion;
the fact-packed weekly Argumenti i Fakti which a few years earUer had been
distributed to just 10,000 Party propagandists, would top out at 35 miUion,
Gorbachev, Perestroika. 75-77.
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becoming the most widely circulated periodical in the world. But die biggest
television audiences still dwarfed the draw of the press, and flie live broadcast of
the Congress of People's Deputies was among the most-watched broadcasts of all
time.^'
Just as Gorbachev had hoped, glasnost began a radical transformation of the public
through openness of information and communication but it was the content of
information which stirred the public into action.
Shane recounts Freud's assertion that, "what is repressed, has a tendency to exact
revenge."^^ In the case of post-glasnost Soviet Union no truer words could be stated.
Glasnost produced an avalanche of information that had been secured in KGB archives,
restricted to unspoken memories or purposefully whited out, as in the Soviet historical
records. The flood of information turned out to be deeply anti-Soviet in content, one
explanation as to the incredible surge in the reading and viewing statistics. Before
glasnost there was limited interest in the Party version of what constituted news, but after
glasnost produced an information society, the response was prolific.
Most si^iiiicantly, the Soviet citizens were ecstatic about the privilege of speaking out
on issues. The most intriguing information that was presented and consumed was
directed <igainst the Party, capturing massive amoxmts of listeners, viewers, and
subscribers. Television reporters, press correspondents, and publication writers foimd
both a new celebrity status and a wealth of information from tiie Soviet public. The Party
found glasnost to be a critical threat to their power.
Shane emphasizes, the central threat came directly to the heart of Gorbachev's
ailment for strengthening the socialist state. Leninism was Grorbachev's hallmark of
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the socialist revolution and he used the image of Lenin to build a platfonn of support
for the perestroika revolution, but Gorbachev was not prepared for the backlash against
Leninism and the Party, an unexpected side-effect of glasnost Instead of imiting the
nation, glasnost coaxed the silent majority to express disillusionment with ttie system and
particularly toward the Party and its foimder, Lenin.
According to Shane, by 1991 most people had completely lost faith in the Party and its
leaders to lead the nation. Data collected through the AU-Union Center for the Study of
Public Opinion showed a significant decrease in, not only the Party, but the entire
Communist system in the Soviet Union. Shane remarks that "[t]he death of the Soviet
illusion.. .took place between 1987 and 1991.. .and there are no real historical
precedents."^' As Shane points out, prior to glasnost the public gave tacit support to the
politics of Soviet Russia, yet there was never anything vaguely close to glasnost from
which to gauge the validity of such s\q)port. Between 1989 and 1991 the Party felt the
in:q)act of glasnost in &e most critical of ways. The Party was regarded as being wi&out
ideological credibility.
Gorbachev possessed a paradoxical role in the demise of Soviet communism. On one
hand he was the leader with democratic dreams willing to risk a change in thinking to
improve the status quo. On the other hand Gorbachev saw himself as a leader of the
status quo that had perfected an illusion of benevolent dictatorship in a workers Utopia.
Shane aptly characterizes the paradox:
Gorbachev often emphasized that Ae Party itself had laimched perestroika and
demanded glasnost, which was true enough, implying that people should tiierefore
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be grateful to the Party. But if a swindler admits that he had cheated you, your
finy at being cheated may well exceed your gratitude for his confession.'"
"New Thinking" took Grorbachev's objectives into an entirely different direction, rapidly
disintegrating Leninism and eliminating P»ty control in all spheres because new thinking
literally implied a new trend of thought. More impratantly, new thinking implied
plurality of thought, characterized as "socialist pluralism" by Goibachev.^^ According to
Gorbachev, plurality of thought and opinion was to be in the interest of socialism, a
definition ^t Shane observes as a prelude to the conflict that would soon split the Party
into political opposition.
The loosening of Paly controls in allowing new thinking contributed to the ultimate
success of glasnost. However, the Party was ill prepared to deal with the onslaught of
information for one very important reason. The content of the information was extremely
damaging against the Party as the ruling eUte. If the content had been supportive to the
communist revohitionaiy spirit, or socialist democracy, or Lenin and the Party as the sole
authority in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's objectives would have been realized. Instead
glasnost encouraged truth, and the truth that poured out of the Soviet population did not
support the Party or socialist principles.
As glasnost led to increasing hostility against the Party and the Soviet state
Gorbachev began to retract his position concerning glasnost. Plagued by the continuing
Cold War foreign policy as well as a growing imease within the Soviet republics,
Gorbachev shifted from the new thinking agenda to enforce allegiance to the national
position. Glasnost had not produced a imified socialist alliance but had fractured the
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internal organs of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev chose to disregard glasnost when, by
1989, he was aware that socialism had been rejected and the revolution discredited
among the population.
Shane states that Gorbachev refused to concede the communist ideology, choosing
instead 'Ho cling to the Soviet illusion long after most of his compatriots had given it
up."^^ Goibachev's responses to upheaval against the Party government that flared up
throu^out the republics were a statement of his defiance against dissident activity.
Beginning with the Baltics' bid for independence, Gorbachev reacted witii a vengeance,
and not with the tolerance that he suggested glasnost could bring to the nation. The
unexpected results occurring under glasnost left Gorbachev frustrated and confused on
the reform position because glasnost was not yielding the e?q)ected results.
Primarily, Gorbachev was a politician with a goal to increase power. Hailing from a
single-Party nation v*^ch had held authority for over seven decades Gorbachev never
anticipated ttie end of the Party rule in the Soviet Union because he believed, as Shane,
Doder, Branson, and even himself have asserted, that the course v^ch Lenin had chosen
had been a correct one. Unfortunately the results that came about through glasnost
revealed another truth that was inescapable. Gorbachev's gamble with glasnost
succeeded in redirecting the Leninist revolution to another destiny that was not as
glorious for the Party as it would be for the society.

^ Ibid., 238.

CHAPTER FOUR
GLASNOST'S TRUTH

Another Soviet Citizen's Perspective:
Andrei Sakharov
For Academician Andrei Sakharov the point of departure from the dogmatic Soviet
system occurred as a result of personal perspective. The respected scientist and recipient
of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize comments:
By the beginning of 1968,1 felt a growing compulsion to speak out on the
fundamental issues of our age. I was influenced by my life experience and a
feeling of personal responsibility, reinforced by the part I'd played in the
development of the hydrogen bomb, the special knowledge I'd gained about
thermonuclear warfare, my bitter struggle to ban nuclear testing, and my
familiarity with the Soviet system.^
Sakharov's compelling position is imderscored by his own admission of existing in a
system where he created the power of massive destruction yet was helpless to the
consequences of such a creation. Sakharov's concern revolved around two factors which
ignited the technological and ideological conflict of the Cold War. The primary factor
was power to be achieved at an international level, an objective that topped the political
priority of both the Soviet Union and America diiring most of the twentiefli-century. The
second factor became a force that Sakharov could not effectively reconcile with his
government.

' Andrei D. Sakharov, Memoirs (New York; Alfred A. Knopfl 1990), 281.
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Ethical considerations were seldom regarded to be as important as gaining and
maintaining power in the Soviet Union. Sakharov reflects on a nation that was well
versed in struggle, a blend of cynicism and fear that shaped "the cult of personality" by
the middle of the 20'*' centuiy. Moreover, Sakharov became aware of a shift in the Soviet
power position, from the initial revolutionary fervor led by the Bolsheviks to a dismissal
of any and all that dared interfere with the growing power of the Communist Party.
Sakharov e^qilains the contradictory nature of Lenin's Party accordingly:
Lenin's initial impulse, and that of most of the other revolutionaries, was in
essence humanitarian and moral; it was the logic of their struggle and the tragic
twists of history that turned them into what they later became and dictated their
course of action. But not only that. There was something inherently false in their
basic pohtical and philosophical premises. That is why objectivity so often was
supplanted by pragmatic considerations and humanism by fanaticism, and why
the Party line and Party struggle triiunphed over moral principles.^
As a Soviet, Sakharov was exposed to the propagandized versions of history and fantastic
accomplishments and goals of tiie Party. However, as a scientist who was educated to the
magnitude of destruction possessed through technological means, Sakharov developed a
sense of respect for creation, especially himianity.
Typical of all academicians in the Soviet Union, Sakharov was trained and directed to
fulfill the expectations of the Party in their objective for authority. Unlike many of his
colleagues, Sakharov never joined Party organizations, rejecting outright an invitation to
join the Commimist Party based on principle, yet his work as a gifted physicist won
Sakharov recognition by the Party. Receiving awards three separate times as a Hero of
Socialist Labor, Sakharov was a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. His
contributions to the sciences in the area of nuclear physics established him as one of the

^ Ibid.,33.

60

Soviet intelligentsia; however, Sakharov's intelligentsia activities were not limited to
the improvement of Soviet miUtary capabihties.
Sakharov's career in physics commenced from the early days of his education. His
father was a physics professor and taught at several institutes and universities in die
Soviet Union. Because Sakharov also excelled in mathematics and scientific studies he
followed the same career as his fa^er. As Sakharov recounts, his family swore no
particular loyalty to the Communist regime and regarded nationahsm as little more than
political justification for exploitation. The defining feature which Sakharov claims
influenced his perspective was the family's love of the Russian culture. literature and
the arts provided inspiration for them, and not political power posturing on the part of the
Commimist Party.
As recoimted in Memoirs. Sakharov was involved in research on thermonuclear
physics for twenty years, living and working in the secret city where Soviet nuclear
weapons were developed, tested, and produced. Sakharov joined the Tamm group of
scientists in 1948, the Soviet equivalent of America's Robert Oppenheimer group of
nuclear scientists. Sakharov comments on the remorse that Oppenheimer felt in his
contribution to nuclear capability, sharing Oppenheimer's disillusionment concerning
"the terrifying, inhuman nature of the weapon we were building."^ Sakharov's concern
was one also shared by his colleagues that worked at the Installation, including Igor
Tamm. Sakharov attributes Tamm as influencing him further in appreciating the
intelligentsia's position in national power struggles and describes Tamm as an
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"independent spirit in matters large and small, in life and in science."^ For the
scientists at the Installation, it was not simply a matter of creating the means of
destruction but of understanding the motivation behind such projects and recognizing that
true power emerges as a result of communication, and not through force.
Sakharov emphasizes that the critical turning point for him occurred two years prior to
the Prague Spring in 1968. Concerned about the potential rehabilitation of Stalin at the
Twenty-third Party Congress, Sakharov's signature appeared on a letter that expressed
tiie intelligentsia's desire to advance social causes over the political. In particular,
Sakharov argued:
I believe that statements on public issues are a useful means of promoting
discussion, proposing alternatives to official poUcy, and focusing attention on
specific problems. They educate the problem at large, and just mi^t stimulate
significant changes, however belated, in the policy and practice of top
government ofiicials. Appeals on behalf of specific individuals and groiq)s also
attract attention to their cases, occasionally benefit a particular individual, and
inhibit future hiiman ri^ts violations throu^ the threat of glasnost [public
disclosure].^
Sakharov's position illustrated his intention of supporting human rights in the Soviet
Union. As a member of the intelligentsia Sakharov was compelled to behave responsibly
in issues of power. The Party's primary goal of securing poUtical authority had
imdermined human rights in the Soviet Union, a fact that Sakharov became increasingly
aware of by 1968.
Upon making the acquaintance of history Professor Roy Medvedev in 1966, Sakharov
gained great insight concerning "dissidents and events of social significance.. .they did
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help me escape from my hermetic world."® When Sakharov read Medvedev's
manuscr^t Let ESstorv Judge, which describes Stalin's crimes against the people, he was
compelled to place blame not only on Stalin but upon the Communist regime which
consolidated power in such a way as to suppress individual rights without benefit of
accountability, politically or ethically.
At about the same time Sakharov met Medvedev, he began receiving, in secret,
information about political dissidents, arrested and confined in psychiatric institutions or
prisons for anti-Soviet violations. Sakharov found himself among the ranks of
intelligentsia that objected to the practice of repressing Soviet citizens according to Party
standards. Encouraged by publications such as Medvedev's and Valeiy Skurlatov's
samizdat circulation A Code of Morals. Sakharov wrote letters to Party ofGcials on behalf
of dissidents, a decision that cost him his lead position at the Installation as well as a
salary reduction. Undaunted, Sakharov continued to utilize literary publications to
express his views on individual rights including a 1967 investigative article on toxic
pollutants in Lake Baikal. Despite Sakharov's personal calls to Leonid Brezhnev and
Andrei Kosygin, his article was dismissed; however, his dissident activities had caught
flie attention of Party officials.
According to Sakharov, <he events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, known as tiie Prague
Spring, coincided witii his essay Reflections on Progress. Peaceful Coexistence, and
Intellectual Freedom. Sakharov describes the Prague Spring in this way:
What so many of us in the socialist countries had been dreaming of seemed to be
finally coming to pass in Czechoslovakia: democracy, including freedom of
expression and abolition of censorship; reform of the economic and social
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systems; ciirbs on the power of the security forces, limiting them to defense
against external flireats; and full disclosure of tiie crimes of &e Stalin
era.. .Even from afar, we were caught up in the excitement and hopes and
enthusiasm of the catchwords: "Prague Spring" and "socialism widi a human
fece."^
Acknowledging the effects of the Prague Spring as "harbingers of the human rights
movement" in the Soviet Union, Sakharov describes the KGB response as "taking tough
countermeasures: firing, blacklisting, public reprimand, expulsion from the Party."^
According to Sakharov, the title he chose for his essay reflected the concerns that the
citizens in flie Soviet Union held. Regardless of ethnic or cultural division, Sakharov's
intent was to bring awareness to universal issues that affected all of humanity. His essay
spoke on the disadvantages of nuclear arms in the world and argued for "convergence"
between capitalist and socialist societies. Additionally, he ai^ed the virtues of such a
world order would have democratic features and honor diversity of thought, existing as
"an open society.'"^ Although Sakharov's essay revealed, as he describes, his Utopian
premise for a world govermnent, he stood committed to principles involving
humanitarian progress, a position that encouraged him to send a copy of the essay to
Brezhnev ratiier than engaging in the typical clandestine activity characteristic of Soviet
reformers.
The events of the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion by Soviet troops closely reflected
tiie circumstances in the Soviet Union. Antonin Novotny established himself as a
Communist Party member under the Stalin regime, becoming President of
Czechoslovakia in 1957. As a Party official Novotny's {irinciple was consolidating
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control with the same dictatorial precision that Stalin used to secure his power.
Z. A. B. Zeman describes Novotny's regime as "manipulators [that] had absolute power,
without having accepted absolute responsibility."

Absolute power included authority

over publications and circulation of information, a situation which Zeman points out was
unheard of for the Czechs under the Habsburg empire. In 1967 the Czechoslovakia press
law was legislated providing strict censorship for writers and publishers, stating that
articles must comply with the "ideological guidance issued by the Communist Party.
As Zeman points out, Czech writers have traditionally integrated political commentary in
their literature. The suppression of information by an external goverranent went directly
against the Czech consciousness and encouraged a national uprising.
In addition to the Czech rebellion the Slovak population resisted Moscow's dictates in
political and socioeconomic policies. In January of 1968, Slovakian Alexander Dubcek
replaced Novotny as Czecholslovakia's President, a move that precipitated the rise of
Czech and Slovak nationalism against the Party. As president, Dubcek led a reform
movement intent on restructuiing the system toward empowering social issues. The
"April Action Programme" called for division of power and freedoms to commimicate
and be informed, uiging con:q)etition to ensure democracy. Zeman comments that;
the most sensitive and crucial issue in Czechoslovak politics at the present time,
the early summer of 1968. . .'if the Commimist Party does not provide for the
fastest development of its effective control from the outside, it wiU have no
guarantee that it will not degenerate at some later time. The communists have
been asked to recognize what the non-communists have known for years: That
sociaUsm sacrifices democracy at its own peril.
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Dubcek's appeal for a unified opposition of Czechs and Slovaks against a single
authority was interpreted by Moscow as a direct threat against the Communist Party.
Amid Warsaw Pact manoeuvres the Russians conducted talks with the Czechs, stressing
the importance of controlling publications in order to control the position of power.

The

Czechs rejected Moscow's line of reasoning which prompted Moscow to force
compliance. Without warning Soviet tanks moved into Czechoslovakia on August 20,
1968 and arrested Dubcek with ''other Czech and Slovak leaders.. .in the name of the
'revolutionary government of the workers and peasants."

The defeat of

Czechoslovakia's bid for democratic liberties alerted Sakharov and other Soviet
dissidents to the social injustices present throughout the Soviet Union at the expense of
personal freedom.
When interviewed by Scandinavian broadcast correspondent Olle Stenholm
concerning the 1973 Anti-Sakharov canqiaign conducted by the Paty, Sakharov
specifically spoke about the lack of freedom as the most critical issue facing Soviet
society. In the interview Sakharov characterized the Soviet Union as "extremely
irrational and also terribly egoistic.. .[a] tendency that actually aims at preserving the
system, maintaining a good appearance to conceal a very unpleasant internal state of
affairs.. .for us all social things are more for show than for reality

The crux of the

interview centers on ideological structure, with Sakharov describing the Soviet Union
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as anti-democratic, a society of "ideological monism" which has strangled society's
potential and leading to a debilitation throughout the nation. When asked what is needed
Sakharov responded:
Our extreme state socialism has led to tiie elimination of private initiative in areas
in which it would be most effective.. .tiie suppression of individual initiative
leads to strict constraints on personal freedom. .. I am talking about personal
enterprise in the field of consumer goods, education, and medicine. All of this no
doubt would have a very positive significance in weakening die extreme
monopoUstic structure of the state. The Party monopoly of administration has
reached such unheard-of levels that even tiie ruling class must realize it can no
longer be tolerated. So—^what is needed? We need first of all greater glasnost,
openness in the work of the administrative ^>paratus.*^
Sakharov goes on to expand on the need for competitive elections and for freedom of the
press. He comments that the intelligentsia has been driven into "ideological de^adation"
as a result of the low lifestyle and ill regard toward intellectualism in the nation.
In 1973, when the interview was conducted, Sakharov's position on the societal needs
in the Soviet Union resembled closely that of Gorbachev more than a decade later. The
defining point between Sakharov and Goibachev when discussing glasnost and society is
the role of the Party. While Sakharov views the Soviet Union under the leadership of the
Patty as anti-democratic and anti-socialist, Gorbachev holds fast to die Leninist ideal that
the Party remain at the pinnacle of power, a perspective that dminishes the glasnost
principle of openness.

Political Dissidents; Citizens or Comrades?
By 1968 when Sakharov became engaged in publishing his own thoughts and opinions
about the idea of an "open society" in Reflections, he also began to acquire a following of
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Soviet dissidents. The presence of a distinguished intellectual such as Sakharov was an
encouraging sign that perhaps, real commtmication on reform issues for society could
begin with the government Sakharov's own commitment to reform was largely inspired
by the ethical considerations which surrounded the scientific profession during the Cold
War era. According to Sakharov, the point of departure from the establishment came
between the years 1965 to 1967 \n^en he acknowledged global fundamental issues to be
political and ethical and not &e military and economical behemoth that occupied the
Soviet agenda.
The distinction of Sakharov's turning point was critical, a departure from the
ideological framework of commtmism that Lenin had created and which was perpetuated
by decades of propagandized information. In order to maintain the position of power the
Party resorted not only to massive propaganda campaigns, but also to a narrowly defined
code of conduct befitting the model Soviet citizen. In a nation that portrayed itself as a
socialist Utopia the members of society found themselves at a crossroads with regard to
national identity. Under Soviet terms people were considered comrades, that is a person
wholly dedicated to tiie socialist system with die pretense that &e system defined them
and knew what was best for everyone in the system. As Shane explains:
From the beginning the Soviet regime was built on a system of belief, a
mythology that citizens learned from earliest childhood and that su&used every
aspect of life. Soviet nine-year-olds were given a book about Lenin called Our
Very Best Friend, maiking their entry into the Pioneers. Its 1978 edition told
tiiem: "We see how day by day, hour by hour, with enthusiasm, joy and pride the
Soviet people are building the radi<uit edifice of Commimism. You, kids, also
will build Conmumist society, and not only build but work under Communism.

Scott Shane, DismantJing Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee
Publisher, 1994), 55.

Shane emphasizes that all societies have their mythologies in order to stimulate
allegiance to the system, yet the Soviet approach insisted on that allegiance from their
citizens, refusing to accept any deviations from the Party line.
In maintaining its autocratic stiucture the Party legislated control factors designed
specifically to restrict controversial trends in the nation. Many Soviet comrades were not
allowed to educate themselves or obtain information suited to tiieir personal interests
without government intervention, and by the mid-sixties, Soviet officials were avidly
prosecuting any dissenters who refused to honor the Soviet law concerning information
and communication.
The RSFSR, or Russian State Federation of Soviet Republics, implemented flie
Criminal Code that defined unacceptable publications. As supplemented by Peter
Reddaway, Article 70 states:
'Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening
Soviet power or of committing particular especially dangerous crimes against the
state, or the [verbal] spreading for the same purpose of slanderous fabrications
which defame the Soviet political and social system, or the circulation or
preparation or keeping, for tiie same purpose, of literature of such content, shall
be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of six montiis to seven years,
with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years, or by exile for a
term of two to five years.'
Article 190-1 reads:
The systematic dissemination by word of mouth of deliberate fabrications
discrediting the Soviet political and social system, or the manufacture or
dissemination in written, printed or other form of works of the same content, shall
be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding three years, or by
corrective labour for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding
one hundred roubles.
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According to Sakharov, Article 70 preceded 190-1 in making the publication and
circulation of anti-Soviet material a criminal action, and Article 190-1 served more as a
det^ent for dissidents of the system. Sakharov argues that, despite an amended
commentary in 1971 explaining that "ttie circulation of fabrications which are not known
to be false by the Party responsible, as well as the expression of mistaken opinions or
suppositions do not constitute crimes under Article 190-1,"'* the courts routinely
bypassed the commentary in order to prosecute more dissidents. Anything deemed by the
courts to be of anti-Soviet information was interpreted as proof of dissident activity and
punishable by law.
The incidence of political dissidents implicated under Article 190-1 increased
substantially. Sakharov's involvement as a human rights activist initiated him into the
world of tiie dissidents, v^o objected both openly and in secret against the intrusions of
the Party in matters of communication and information. In adctition to protesting the
content of Article 190-1 Sakharov was a co-founder of the Human Rights Committee of
1970. Together with Valery Chalidze and Andrei Tverdokhlebov, the Committee gained
international recognition for tiieir efforts in combating injustices involving freedom of
expression and the right to dispense information. The committee was laimched largely in
response to a rising number of dissident prosecutions in the Soviet Union, although
Sakharov acknowledges the formation in 1969 of the Initiative Group for the Defense of
Human Ri^ts, as the first organization to formally appeal to the United Nations on
behalf of human ri^ts in flie USSR.'' Still, with the Human Rights Committee of
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November 1970 the publicity for dissidents began to attract attenti<m at an international
level. The contrived accusations by the Party against members of society only worsened
after Sakharov's attempt at publicizing the human ri^ts issues in the USSR. Moreover,
as Sakharov recalls, dissidents were subjected to inhumane abuses which were condoned
the Soviet political system in an effort to force compliance. Sakharov was among a
growing population of Soviets who understood, in the mid-sixties, ttiat recognition of
system injustice was essential to the progress of humanity in die USSR.
Because the Party was unable to suppress completely all the channels of
c(nnmunication, such as radio broadcasts and the open circulation of information, the
incidence of dissident activity increased. At a time when Soviet citizens experienced
disillusionment with the Utopian illusion of the socialist system, the nature of dissident
activity was broadly interpreted by the auttiorities so lhat trivial indulgences, such as
listening to foreign broadcasts or reading literature imacceptable to Soviet Party standards
came under tihe criminal code of conduct.
Shane reviews the case of Andrei Mironov who was arrested in 1985 for consorting
with foreigners and engaging in anti-Soviet activities. Particularly, Mironov was
punished because he shared "subversive" information and opinions with the public.
Shane chronicles Mironov's struggle with Soviet authorities as he attempts to circulate
books, newspapers, and magazines tiiat had been banned by the Party's publication
censors, Glavlit. Additionally, the KGB charged Mironov with "anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda with the aim of imdermining and weakening Soviet power, spreading
slanderous fabrications, discrediting the Soviet state and social system."^" Among his
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criminal actions Mironov had copied and distributed copies of the "sami^at", or selfpublished materials, a crime that ignited die forces of KGB agents intent on apprehending
the culprit before forbidden information could reach too many citizens. Mironov
explained to Shane that the KGB expended so much energy in tailing and observing his
illegal information activities that it became ridiculous. Still, the KGB acconq)lished the
in^sonment of Mironov with "five fat volimies of evidence" in violation of Article 70.
The birth of samizdat in the Soviet Union came in 1966 at precisely the time Sakharov
and other intelligentsia members recognized the contradictions present in a nation that
professed socialism to be the ideal system yet, persecuted growing numbers of citizens
who rejected Party values in the interest of diversification of personal knowledge. The
contradictions were represented in samizdat publications such as the Chronicle, that
regarded the ri^t to expression as fundamental to citizens regardless of state ideology.
Unfortunately, the Party did not regard the ri^t of free expression to be in keeping wifli
flie Commimist ideology, a single-minded logic that perceived alternative mentalities as a
threat to the system. Still tiie Commimist ideology and the Soviet state was not a system
of choice for tiie millions of citizens vdio now fell in tiie Soviet Union's borders, and the
contributors to samizdat became "the U.S.S.R.'s only forum of free thought."^^
Challenging the suppression of information in the only way possible became a
calculated risk for many citizens. However, the exhilaration of freedom of
communication only encouraged contributors to samizdat journals such as the Chronicle.
Censorship could be escaped long enough to explore other reahns of thought and created
an impetus to form tiie Democratic Movement, described by Reddaway as being
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consistently diverse. According to Reddaway, the defining quality of the Democratic
Movement rested in its objectives to address the realities of the Soviet system, rather than
conceding to Party dictates. Specifically, Reddaway regards tiie de-Stalinization speech
which Khrushchev delivered in 1956 as a "feeling.. .among the liberal intelligentsia that
the Communist Party did not—contrary to its claims—^know aU the answers, moreover
was capable of gross errors.

In effect, Reddaway argues the role of the intelligentsia

was integral in calling attenticm to social injustices committed by the Party against the
citizens.
The Chronicle was foimded in the spring of 1968, and according to Reddaway, strove
to define Article 19 of the U.N. 's Universal Declaration of Human Ri^ts which states:
Everyone has the ri^t to fi'eedom of opinion and expression; this ri^t includes
fieedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media md regardless of fi^ntiers.^^
Essentially, the publication, although operating covertly, embodied the truer principles of
democracy by allowing diversity of thought among the population. The primary
objective of the Chronicle, according to Reddaway, is " openness, non-secretiveness,
fi^edom of information and expression. . .in the one Russian word glasnost."^ The
contrary point was that the Soviet Union's single political Party could not afford to allow
diversity of thought in an open forum because it threatened its power consequently, the
rights of society had to be sacrificed for tiie stability of the system.
The presence of samizdat in the Soviet Union indicates that a certain segment of the
society was at odds witii the system, refijsing to concede entirely to Party censorship and
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risking punishment to communicate freely with fellow citizens. The comrade would
have obeyed Party standards without question, but the Soviet citizen was consumed with
questions, and in the spirit of glasnost, he desired truth in the answers.

Why Glasnost Triumphed in Society
Most notable to glasnost is that the desire to communicate freely and wi&out
restriction was already prevalent in Soviet society. Despite millions of political prisoners
and the arbitrary rule of Soviet law, which denied a more progressive standard with
regard to commimication and freedom of information, there existed in society the natural
instinct to expression. The evidence lies in the testimonies of the political dissidents,
numbers too massive to be accurately accoimted for, yet their plight has not gone
unrecognized.
Ironically, those that have been silenced by the system continued to commimicate,
proving that communication cannot be forever controlled by political policies. One of the
exemplary literary figures of the Soviet era was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. While serving
in World War n Solzhenitsyn was sentenced to eight years in a labor camp and then
exiled for writing in a personal letter a criticism of Stalin. After Khrushchev's deStalinization speech Solzhenitsyn was rehabilitated and published his first novel in 1962,
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Althou^ the Soviet writer was nominated for
the Lenin Prize in Literature for his work he was denied it because of the controversial
nature of the novel's content. Solzhenitsyn continued to write, but his stories were
seldom published by Soviet journals that argued the literature could be used by foreign
powers to attack the Soviet regime. Consequently, Solzhenitsyn was published in the
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West, a situation that always compromised political reliabiUty of Soviet authors. As a
iiiither consequence, Solzhenitsyn was e^qielled from the U.S.S.R,'s Writer's Union in
the aiitunm of 1969, an event that tiie Chronicle described as "the extent to which Soviet
dissenters of all persuasions look to Solzhenitsyn for a moral example."" As
documented by Reddaway, Solahenitsyn responded to the expulsion with a letter that
emphasizes the need for openness:
Shamelessly trampling imderfoot your own statues, you have expelled me in
my absence, as at the soimd of a foealarm, without even sending me a summons
by telegram, without even giving me the four hours I needed to come from
Ryazan and be present at the meeting. You have shown openly that the
RESOLUTION preceded the 'discussion'. Was it less awkward for you to invent
new charges in my absence? Were you afraid of being obliged to grant me ten
minutes for my answer? I am compelled to substitute this letter for those ten
minutes.
Blow Hhe dust off the clock. Your watches are behind the times. Throw open
tiie heavy curtains which are so dear to you—^you do not even suspect that the day
has already dawned outside. It is no longer that stifled, that sombre, irrevocable
time when you expelled Akhmatova in the same servile manner. It is not even
tiiat timid, frosty period v\iien you expelled Pasternak, whining abuse at him.
Was this shame not enough for you? Do you want to make it greater? But the
time is near when each one of you will seek to erase his signature from today's
resolution.
Blind leading the blind! You do not even notice that you are wandering in the
opposite direction from the one you yourselves have annoimced. At this time of
crisis you are incapable of suggesting anything constructive, anything good for
our society, which is gravely sick—only your hatred, your vigilance, your 'hold
on and don't let go'.
Your clumsy articles fall apmt; your vacant minds stir feebly—^but you have
no arguments. You have only your voting and your administration. And that is
why neither Sholokhov nor any of you, of the whole lot of you, dared reply to the
famous letter of Lydia Chukovskaya, who is the pride of Russian pubhcistic
writing. But tiie administrative pincers are ready for her; how could she allow
people to read her book fThe Deserted House/ when it has not been published?
Once the AUTHORITIES have made up their minds not to publish you—then
stifle yourself, choke yourself, cease to exist, and don't give your stuff to anyone
to read!
They are also tiiu'eatening to expel Lev Kopelev, the front-line veteran, who
has already served ten years in prison although he was completely irmocent.
Ibid. 339.
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Today he is guilty: he intercedes for the persecuted, he revealed the hallowed
secrets of his conversation with an influential person, he disclosed an OFFICIAL
SECRET. But why do you hold conversations like these which have to be
concealed from tiie people? Were we not promised fifty years ago that never
again would there be any secret diplomacy, secret talks, secret and
incomprehensible appointments and transfers, that the masses would be informed
of all matters and would discuss them openly?
'The enemy will overhear'—that is your excuse. The eternal, omnipresent
'enemies' are a convenient justification for your fimctions and your very
existence. As if there were no enemies v\4ien you i»-omised immediate openness.
But what would you do without 'enemies'? You could not live without
'enemies'; hatred, a hatred no better than racial hatred, has become your sterile
atmosphere. But in this way a sense of our single, common hxmianity is lost and
its doom accelerated. Should the Antarctic ice melt tomorrow, we would all
become a sea of drowning humanity, and into v^ose heads would you then be
drilling your concepts of 'class struggle'? Not to speak of the time when the few
surviving bq)eds will be wandering over a radioactive earth, ^ing.
It is high time to remember that we belong first and foremost to humanity.
And that man has distinguished himself from the animal world by THOUGHT
and SPEECH. And these, naturally, should be FREE. If they are put in chains,
we shall return to tiie state of animals.
OPENNESS, honest and complete OPENNESS—that is the first condition of
health in all societies, including our own. And he who does not want this
opoiness for our country cares nothing for his fatherland and thinks only of his
own interest. He who does not wish fliis openness for his fatherland does not
want to purify it of its diseases, but only to driw them inwards, there to fester.
Sol2henitsyns's e?q)ulsion was met with criticism from the Writer's Union who claimed
that the writer slandered &e system in his literature. Solzhenistsyn's followers, including
the scores of other Soviet writers, intelligentsia, and foreign literary publishers, spoke
against the Soviet system, and tiieir opinions found expression in samizdat.
SoMienitsyn, like Sakharov, found an audience of Soviet citizens through samizdat
ttiat supported the concept of openness in society. The fact that bofli Solzhenitsyn and
Sakharov were celebrated dissidents helped to attract outside attention from foreign
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media. However, the consequences of challenging the Soviet system did not escape
either Sakharov or Sobihenistsyn since both received the punishment of exile. The
objective of samizdat publications like the Chronicle hoped to call attention to the fact
that die number of ordinaiy Soviet citizens that had joined the ranks of dissidents far
exceeded the estimate. Reddaway emphasizes that:
Not only do the Chronicle's contents tend to be overlooked, but the fact is also
ignored that just as the journal has grown steadily in size, so too—despite all
iarests—have the number of correspondents and their geogr^hical distribution.
Certainly the Chronicle has a small circulation—^at a guess perhaps a few
thousand copies. But many of its readers and correspondents, while politically on
the fiinges of society, are professionally at its core: physicists, chemists,
biologists, geologists, economists, teachers, doctors, journalists—people without
whom society cannot progress, nor missile programmes prosper.
Notably, i^lien Reddaway documented the pages of the Chronicle, the challenges to the
system appeared to be at an increase. AccOTding to Reddaway in 1971, the idea that
Sakharov could be arrested for his part in human rights activities seemed remote
especially taking in consideration the incompetence of the Brezhnev regime.
However, Sakharov's arrest and subsequent exile to Gorky in 1980 served as
evidence that even if the Brezhnev administration were faltering in leadership, the system
itself was solid enough in terms of stagnation. What was indeed a threat to the
foimdations of Communist Party power was reform, and to this scenario Reddaway
provides an extraordinaiy commentaiy seemingly intended for Gorbachev:
|T|f a strong leader were to emerge, and were tiien somehow to redynamize the
regime, he would certainly hesitate to arrest certain prominent members of the
Democratic Movement.^®
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Reddaway continues to e?qplain that the Democratic Movement's objectives are to
reform the system "to create closer unity, both practically and spiritually,"^' for the
individuals in society. The rallying point indicated by Reddaway, on the basis of his
interviewing the contributors to samizdat, revolved around information, the right to
obtain information and to dispense information without being subjected to Party
censorship primarily because '^e movement's general aim has been flie democratization
of Soviet society."^" Only by taking an information publication like the Chronicle
underground could the right to communicate interactively be engaged in the Soviet
Union, precisely because the citizens lacked that democratic privilege under the
leadership of the Communist Party- The presence of samizdat indicates that a great
number of Soviet citizens desired the ri^t to communicate freely, receiving information
which they selected as a matter of personal preference.
Additionally, the premise for democratic ri^ts was present in Soviet society at the
time Gorbachev took office, as he admitted to in both Perestroika and Memoirs.
For over seven decades the Soviet Union had existed as a communist nation, however,
the absence of democratic ri^ts was increasingly obvious to the people at large after the
major industrialization period in the Soviet Union came to a close. It is true that the Post
World War n economic trends contributed significantly to the disparity between the
Eastern and Western nations. In terms of economics, by the time the technological wave
descended on Western countries, incorporating Asian nations in the expansion of
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technological global markets, the Soviet Union began to feel the effects, especially in
terms of inadequate information systems. Even though the advanced industrialized
nations had made great technological strides to flie benefit of their economies, there were
also improvements made in the humanities, such as improvements in education and
medical care, which are not always reflected on economic charts. The fact that the world
was progressing in terms of efficient communications and information systems could no
longer be ignored by the Soviet government Gorbachev's call for glasnost can be
evaluated as his awareness of the demands for global economic competition, but his
refusal to view honestly Ihe damage that inadequate Party politics had wrought on the
morale of Soviet society led to serious confrontations after glasnost was formally
condoned.
Shane's accoimt e^lains the contradictions that Gorbachev faced in the mid-eighties
as he tried to reconcile Soviet style socialism values witfi the need for progressive
democracy in opening the chatmels of information. According to Shane, Gorbachev
made the following remarks:
'Glasnost,' he said on his Siberian tour in the autumn of 1988, 'is necessary. But
it must be based on our values. It must be everything that serves socialism and
serves the people.' A^in, a coi^le of weeks later, addressing top editors and
broadcast executives, he seemed to be speaking in oxymorons: 'Publish
everything. There must be plurality of opinions. But plurality aimed at defending
and strengthening the line of perestroika and the cause of socialism. . . .We are
not talking about any kind of limits on glasnost and democracy. What limits?
Glasnost in the interest of the people and of socialism should be without limits. I
repeat—in the interests of the people and of socialism.
Shane goes on to explain tiiat flie Party had approved of glasnost only in terms of
strengthening the Party principles of commimism, a position that Lenin had initiated after
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taking power in 1917. Consequently, Gorbachev too, relied on the Leninist ^iproach to
glasnost in a socialist society. The defining issue for Crorbachev was that the Leninist
approach used to create Ifae Party autocracy never called for democracy. The term
democracy, used in context with glasnost, implied fi^edoms and rights that the Soviet
population had always desired as far as communication of information was concerned.
When Gorbachev used tihe term "democracy" to e?qplain the premise that glasnost was
founded on, the Party was in effect relinquishing tfie specificity of definition which had
traditionally accompanied glasnost, as public opinion that existed within the law.
By 1988, glasnost had released enough information to exact a decisive impact
throughout the Soviet Unioa The contention became apparent as glasnost gaiited power
among the people, displacing the Party in power. Consequently, while glasnost was
lifting the silence that had shrouded the nation, Ck)ibachev became increasingly alarmed
at llie results glasnost was piroducing. Shane describes an exasperated Goibachev who
realized by 1991 that glasnost was spinning out of control, by his standards. The Party
was not used to being upstaged in terms of authority, and glasnost had accomplished an
eradication of the Party's autiiority in three years time.

CHAPTER FIVE
PARADOX

biformation Revolution and the Liberalization of Society
When Gorbachev employed the use of glasnost to challenge the Party's inadequate
administration, the availability of information continued to be controlled. Until
glasnost, tiie Party measured the availability of information in the Soviet Union,
filtering, isolating, and distributing on a "need to know basis." As described by
Shane throughout his book, Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet
Union, the majority of Soviet citizens were duped for decades into acceptance of a
narrow perspective that hig^ghted only that w^ch the Party deemed to be of
importance, and, as a consequence, that which depicted the Party most favorably.
It was the literal definition of glasnost that betrayed the Party, a truth ^t
Gorbachev could not reconcile with his call for upgraded socialism in a nation
dominated by a single Party leadership. Glasnost, defined as openness, or publicity,
literally took into account eveiy individual's perspective and opinion. As Gorbachev
recoimts in Memoirs:
Thanks to glasnost, perestroika began to find an increasingly broad social
base. It is difiicult to overestimate the importance of this... .Freedom of
speech made it possible to go over the heads of the apparatchiks and turn
directly to flie people, to give them the incentive to act and win tiieir

siq)port... .CHasnost was a powerful weapon, and people soon realized it
Although Gorbachev reconunended the use of glasnost, hoping for a stronger Party
presence in an economically improved nation, the people were the ones that
implemented the reform to its lull capability. As soon as glasnost was condoned by
Gorbachev, the reform took off on its own course primarily because glasnost included
the people and was no longer limited to exclusive Party participation.
The ironic consequences glasnost delivered upon the Soviet Union came about
because, "Gorbachev's experiment with information produced. . .a revolution, thus
proving fatal to his Party, his country, and his own political career."^ The factors that
proved to be most contradictoiy centered around Gorbachev's insistence that glasnost
was devoted to the Party principle and also to the truth. Those factors proved to be a
combustible combination that e^loded in Gorbachev's Kremlin within months of the
implementation of glasnost.
hi the avalanche of information that poured out of tiie Soviet Union, the most
damaging truth of all asserted that the Party was grossly corrupt and had mismanaged
the affairs of the Soviet entire. From the centralized economy of the Soviet Union to
the societal infrastructure, the Party had dominated the system in a vigilant and
authoritarian manner. Unfortunately, by the time glasnost came into practice, the
system was at a stage of decay, the result of an antiquated Party policy concerning
information. The ironic consequences which awaited the Party, and Gorbachev, was
that the information which the Party had guarded for decades in order to keep power
was strangling the life out of the Soviet Union. No aspect had been left untouched by
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the untruths the Party held up to the public as reality Glasnost truly did let in the
light, as Gorbachev had desired, but the shadows that appeared fell the darkest around
the Communist Party.
According to Shane, "[tjhe death of the Soviet illusion, for most people, took place
between 1987 and 1991—^an astonishly rapid demise... .and there are no real
historical precedents."^ Shanes's information, acquired through polling results
conducted by the first organization to study public opinion in the Soviet Union,
measures tiie extent to which the population was affected by glasnost. The results
show a steady decline in the legitimacy factor of the nation's government, falling
from a 25 percent lack of trust as of December 1989, to nearly 70 percent rejection of
Party politics in July 1991. As Shane emphasizes, it was not an onslau^t of tanks
and bombs which destroyed the credibility of the Party but an onslaught of
information.'* As glasnost began to take effect, revitalizing tiie citizens to begin
participating in the renewal process just as Gorbachev requested, information became
available fhat challenged die Party's ideological structure.
By 1987 the Party was called upon to account for events, long passed in Soviet
history, but which continued to be a source of pain for many members of the
population. The most aching remnant of Soviet history was undoubtedly Stalinism, a
time that scarred the nation by developing a mentality of shame and fear. Shane gives
a compelling account of the "restoration of history" in the Soviet Union particularly
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underscoring Ihe tragedy of Stalin's totalitarianism as an era which "had torn the
country's heart out in the late 1930's"^ As a result of glasnost, an abundance of
information revealed the horrors of Stalinism, painting a shocking picture of rape and
ruin of an entire population under one phobic dictatorship. Beginning with the murder
of the Romanov family in 1918, the list of terror accumulated wifli glasnost including
the assassination of Sei^ei Kirov vy^ch touched off the Great Purges, the execution
of Nikolai Bukharin and other Bolsheviks, hi addition, tiiousands of Red Army
ofiGcers and citizens began to be accounted for according to the principle of glasnost,
not flie Party. The truth which Gorbachev had heralded as the Soviet's epiphany,
spoke not of heroic conquests under Stalin's leadership, but rather a concerted effort
by the government to master a situation of terrorization against the citizens.
More importantly, &e violations that occurred in the illusion of creating a socialist
Utopia were silenced at the expense of the people, denying them openness of
communications and the right to information. Even more disturbing were the efforts
of the Party to cover up the truth of Stalin's crimes and the perpetuation of the Soviet
illusion under waves of Party manufactured propaganda. When Gorbachev chose to
implement glasnost, he had absorbed enough Party pragmatism to make him
confident that Party objectives were legitimately concerned with the betterment of
society. Information proved differently.
The information which poured into the Soviet Union after glasnost arrived
amounted to a diverse array of subjects, from Ihe literary arts to economics to sex.
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The circulation of information consumed society. The Soviets were hungry for a
difference of perspective, a sincere re-telling of historical events, and a new brand of
entertainment that exhilarated the public. The infonnation that now made its debut in
the Soviet newspapers, magazines, and on radio and television broadcasts had already
been received in the West as a result of publication legalities. Yet, flie Soviet
audience embraced this "new" information with a passion tiiat exceeded the degree of
interest that &e same literature had received with its initial publications in the West.
According to Shane, the Soviet Union held the leading position as publisher of books,
but the content was dictated by the Party standards and, unfortunately for the Party,
"not what people wanted."® As Gorbachev had guessed, the people were most hun^
for &e truth, as evidenced by the tremendous response glasnost brought to Soviet
publications and broadcasts.
The ironic part of the equation was that Gorbachev missed the impact that glasnost
would cany on the population in terms of the "demand economics" so prevalent in
the capitalistic countries. In fact, the population energetically consumed information
such as book publications just released from censorship, Solzhenitsyn's Gulag
Archipelago and Boris Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago. Television broadcasts catered
exclusively to topics of public interest, with programs such as Leningrad's Public
Opinion and in Moscow, Vzglvad. or the View, retaining a major audience. In
addition weekly publications noted tremendous increases in subscriptions as a result
of provocative stories and articles that fired the interests of the people. According to
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Isaac J. Tarasulo, the magazine, Qgonvok. doubled its subscriptions from 561,415
in 1987 to 1,313,349 and the total periodical increase in the Soviet Union was over 18
million by 1987.^ The most con^elling part of the increase in the circulations
revolves around content The information available was satisfying the need for
diverse information that was not approved of before glasnost
Shane notes that die periodical Druzhba Narodov ran a serialization of Anatoly
Rybakov's Children of the Arbat which takes place just before Stalin began his
puiging campaign. The circulation of the periodical increased by seven times as
much before Rybakov's story appeared. Not only celebrated authors were published.
Shane chronicles the work of a fifty plus broadcast journalist who pursued the truth
concerning the whereabouts of executed victims during Stalin's crimes. Alexander
Milchakov conducted his own interviews, collecting information, compiling
witnesses testimonies to the tragedies committed by Soviets against oflier Soviets.
Wittiout access to archives Kfilchakov produced an expose, published in the
September 1988 journal Sem'ia. or Family, entitled Ashes of the Executed, that not
only described the events of Stalinism but indicated approximate burial places where
the remains of the victims were unceremoniously buried. By 1988 the KGB
conceded to Milchakov's vigilance and produced information from Soviet archives
disclosing Ihe names and fates of executed citizens. Shane describes the in:^)act of
information as singularly creating an information industry that quickly toppled the
Party press, Pravda. and its affiliate broadcasting network, Vremva.
Now Marx's dictum that imder commimism the state would wither away
appeared to be working in reverse: as Communist ideology shriveled, so did
^ Isaac J. Tarasulo, ed., Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press ( Wilmington,
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86

the totalitarian state. It was butting out of people's lives, no longer telling
tfxem vdiat to think, where to work, vviioni to vote for, vsiiom to hate... .A
new popular culture was bom, and people who were not caught up directly in
pK)litics, whether their interest was Orthodox liturgy, rock music, or sexual
techniques, became beneficiaries of glasnost^
The democratization of Soviet society involved a diversity of material made available
to £q)peal to many different personal preferences. Glasnost escaped the Party line of
restricted information because differences existed among the public, and glasnost's
pubUc consciousness proved to be stronger than the single-minded communist
consciousness that the Par^ insisted was the truth.
Plurahty of tastes and opinions, and of thoughts and attitudes emerged with
glasnost, and the people embraced die refreshing divergence. Again Shane has
documented the response of Soviet citiz^s who drank in glasnost, among them 82
year old Maria Andreyeva whose comments epitomize the impact that glasnost had:
'Ogonyok used to lie around at the hairdresser's [and]. . . Now the whole
coimtry reads it. Korotich has uncovered all kinds of evUdoing by Stalin.
He's telling us the tnith.' Maria Andreyeva was.. .old enough to remember
the Revolution and to have cast her meaningless vote in dozens of
meaningless elections. 'You know what's good?' she said. 'These people
aren't standing in line for sugar, not for bread, not for meat. They're standing
in line for ideas.''
Another recollection comes from Vitaly Korotich, the editor of Ogonvok who
explained "in a 1988 television appearance 'For me, glasnost is simply a return to tiie
norm,'

The response to glasnost was deafening not only because the information

that was available came from the public, but also because the Party resistance to
public disclosure increased glasnost's value tremendously. Once the process of
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liberalization began, it was impossible to stop because freedom of expression in
society became not only necessary to heal but to progress.

Power Politics and the End of the Soviet Union
At the point of realization that glasnost was breaking from his intended course,
Gorbachev began to recant his reform policy, calling for an adherence to the Leninist
principle. Because, as Doder and Branson recognize in their account of glasnost,
Gorbachev perceived his power as initiating reform from above and below witii no
accountability, he also regarded popular response to fall in line with the Soviet
political agenda of perestroika and reject any deviation as a matter of Soviet socialist
principle, Leninism. Gorbachev's position reflected the Party perspective, vigilantly
protecting Party interests of power. Contraiy to Gorbachev's position, under glasnost
the revolution from below not only rejected the Party's political agenda but its entire
operation precisely, as a matter of democratic principle.
The critical eye of glasnost settled finally on the Communist Party, and what was
revealed was disagreeable to tiie population that was experiencing a resurgence of
freedoms. As Doder and Branson succinctly e^lain, " Only after Gorbachev's
glasnost did the public begin to face the facts: that the Soviet way of life was
miserable.. .and that the Party was losing its sense of direction and purpose."" The
damning evidence was contained in information tiiat glasnost held up for pubUc
scrutiny, and within months the Party was under a persistent and wide-spread attack
because it had assumed to know all of the answers to the economic, ideological,

''Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Penguin Books,
1990), 145.

88

philosophical, and political directions a communist nation should follow. The Party
had endowed itself with absolute knowledge and absolute power witiiin the system.
With the effects of glasnost spreading rapidly throughout the Soviet Union, the Party
had to face absolute consequences of its socioeconomic policies. As a result of
political authority that for decades rejected democratic practices to maintain power,
Gorbachev and the Party were faced witti an admission of guilt in executing an
ideological premise that deviated in practice to become a full blown e?q)loitation of
the masses. No greater evidence of such exploitation was required than the
information that glasnost produced.
The Constitution of the USSR, legislated in 1936, stated that freedom of speech,
the press, of assembly, and other communications were expressly guaranteed by the
law. Glasnost revealed another truth to the Soviet citizens who for decades believed
that their personal freedoms were genuine and protected. Instead, with ^e
implementation of glasnost, a different truth emerged that exposed the Party as
negligent in upholding democratic rights.
That Stalin was guilty of mass executions of his population in the cause of
exterminating the "enemies of the people" was no longer a shocking admittance to
many who had read personal accounts through samizdat sources or had relatives that
lived through the terror. The (Usturbing trend that persisted was that the Party
leadership under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chemenko, and Gorbachev
continued to grasp onto the idea that the Party was on course with the MarxistLeninist principle and advocated sincere democratic socialism in tiie nation.
However, as Shane, Doder, Branson, and even Gorbachev relate in their publications,
the ideal was one formed in error from tiie conception of the Communist Party. The
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credibility of the Communist Party was challenged by a careful examination of the
methods that were an actuality in the political system and then reforms, such as
glasnost, that illuminated the necessity for democratic means. Gorbachev comments
on Ae transition that the Party underwent when faced with glasnost's plurality of
consciousness;
After the l" Congress of People's Deputies, power began to pass to the
Soviets. The Party, as is proper in a democratic society, would no longer
direct the nation's development and had to begin operating by political means.
.. -Thus began the most difGcult stage for the Parly—in which it sought its
place in a society that was renewing itself.
Gorbachev points out that the Party recognized the time for change by the time his
reforms were initiated. Yet, the critical realization revolved around the reconciliation
between the Party that had occupied the central position in socioeconomic affairs with
the society who, as Grorbachev emphasizes, found themselves in a revolution against
the Party autiiority for mismanagement of socioeconomics and politics.
The fact that tfie Soviet Union had no plurality divisions in its poUtical system
made the Party particularly vulnerable, being the onty accountable entity for the state
of affairs in all areas of the nation that were increasingly coming under review by the
press and broadcasters. Instead of basking in the light of benevolence that Gorbachev
had anticipated, as he delivered his seventieth-aimiversary speech for the October
Revolution in Red Square, November of 1987, a curious defection began among the
Party apparatus itself.
Particularly troubling for Gorbachev, who extolled the virtues of Leninism during
the bulk of his anniversaiy speech, was the fact that glasnost's effect had splintered
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the govenunent into factions that conducted polemical arguments now in full piiblic
view. Doder and Branson comments that:
With glasnost blooming as never before, the entire cotmtry seemed to have
become a vast debating society. From the point of view of the Brezhnev era,
the Soviet Union was in the gr^ of an almost subversive spirit, lacking in due
respect for Bolshevik propositions, and toying with dissident ideas for which
people only a few years earlier were sentenced to long prison terms."
Gorbachev embraced the new sense of political participation in the nation, but widi
reservations. When the issue of territorial security came to the fore with nationality
upheavals in parts of Central Asia and the Baltics, Gorbachev pretended not to notice
the issue of self-determination to which glasnost had led.
The fact that the Soviet Union encompassed eleven time zones and 110 ethnic
groups presented a crucial consideration to the Party's political stance. A one-party
system that advocated a single ideological commitment could not practice glasnost's
democratization without facing one very important fact. Not eveiyone believed in
Leninism as profoundly as the Party expected, and when it came to politics, the Party
had to force allegiance to the communist objective, as demonstrated by the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956 or the 1968 Prague Spring.
Gorbachev had expressly refused to employ force when he initiated his reforms,
as Doder and Branson argue, because he was trying to avoid cotmections with
Stalinism in power politics. However, as a result of Leninism, Gorbachev was faced
with trying to sell the idea that commimism was advantageous to republics that had
been brutally imperialized by flie Soviet power. EEs argument fell on deaf ears aid
consequently provided a springboard for the republics to declare their independence
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from the USSR. The most prevalent theme in the nationality urgency became a
recognition by Gorbachev fliat truth did not ultimately lay at the feet of Lenin and the
Party he created in Russia. The crisis that loomed before the Soviet leader is
succinctly characterized in Doder and Branson's analysis:
Here was the central paradox of Gorbachev's rule—the more he sought to
disburse power, the more he found it necessary to concentrate power in his
own hands... .He was trying, as Sakharov chided him publicly, "to get a
democratic process through undemocratic me^is.""
The democratic factors of openness and public interaction that accompanied glasnost
mixed badly wi& the authoritarian realities of Soviet politics, a combination that
literally exploded Gorbachev's idealism of commimist destiny.
John ]Vfiller offers an interpretation concerning Gorbachev's position that also
illustrates the contradictions present between the Party otgective of socialist equality
and the democracy foimd in glasnost. Specifically, Miller points to the emergence of
(he Soviet middle class who required "support in finding an independent voice,

a

new role that was politically democratic in nature. As Miller goes on to explain, the
consequences of new and independent voices in the public forum heralded a plurality
of interests not only among the society but among the govermnent officials as well.
Essentially glasnost slipped from a reform that was fashioned to advance
socioeconomics without disrupting the political principles upon which the Party was
erected. By the time Gorbachev realized tiie dissension that was emerging within tiie
Parly infrastructure, he became defiant, but glasnost's energy had become a fact of
Soviet life.
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The establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies by Sakharov and Boris
Yeltsin created a parliamentary structure that consisted of both non-communist and
communist members and which defined the break from single Party politics. The
presence of Yeltsin profoimdly disturbed the stability of Party politics for one very
inqjortant reason—a rejection of commimist identification that was so integral in the
founding and consolidation of the Party for decades. Doder and Branson relate an
incident in vi^ch Yeltsin publicly declared himself a socialist democrat to which
Gorbachev resixmded, shortly after, that he was a dedicated communist. The incident
depicts the spUt of identities and opinions accompanying glasnost and also illustrates
the necessity for a forum to air constructively such differences. Gorbachev's
response to Yeltsin's declaration began a struggle within the Party apparatus that
ultimately escalated tensions until, as Miller accounts, Gorbachev foimd himself at
&e epicenter of three distinct competitive forces—^the military, Yeltsin's Russian
administration, and the non-Russian republics.
The coup of August 1991 relegated the position of Gorbachev, as President of the
CPSU engaging reform meant to stimulate the Soviet socioeconomic position, to one
that reflected the growing frustration among the population that was publicly
dissenting against the Party form of sociopolitical administration. Increasingly
Gorbachev clashed with the splintering effects brought about through glasnost
primarily because he was a dedicated communist and could not fathom any deviation
from Party supremacy in political affairs. Even as Gorbachev sought a reconciliation
to the nuclear conflict of the Cold War, the prevailing conflict existed within his own
national borders, a conflict of social principles that he had initiated when he called for
glasnost.
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The coup ultimately illustrated the deep riit between the old ^lard, Brezhnevites
that yearned for the stability that controlled information brought to society, and tiiie
radicals led by Yeltsin that defied the system's defects, openly, as glasnost allowed,
fronically, Gforbachev was caught in the middle of the rift, betrayed by his commimist
colleagues that had staged the coi^, and rescued by Yeltsin, the political '^ew
thinker" in the Kremlin who had publicly renounced conmiunism as a ''dream beyond
the clouds,"a remark met with disapproval by Gorbachev who viewed flie
rebellious nature of Yeltsin as a threat to the stability of the socialist system and
communist ideology. Another ironic development, as Shane presents, is that
Goibachev kept informed throughout the coup by means of foreign broadcasts, BBC,
Voice of America, and Radio Liberty while Soviet audiences were entertained with
classical music performances for hours. Glasnost had not failed the Soviet leader
during the political showdown with Party hardliners yet glasnost did fail to revitalize
the Party as Gorbachev had hoped. Instead, as a consequence of glasnost, the Party
was challenged openly to be politically accountable for the myths under which the
Soviet socioeconomic system operated. The coi^ was not the Party's shining
moment to re-engage control of infonnation which in effect would control the
population once again. Glasnost had denied that possibility to the Party, and the coup
of August 1991 was played out on a world stage as testimony to the impact that
glasnost produced in the Soviet Union.

Shane, Dismantiing Utopia, 240.
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Irreconcilable Differences: Why Democracy Survived and
The Communist Party Fell From Power
The lack of democracy in the Soviet Union was apparent for two reasons, the
refusal of the Party to incorporate civil liberties for fear of disintegrating political
power and &e covert actions in v^ch the population engaged, in an effort to have a
voice. Pnmarily, the measures that the Commimist Party engaged in to control the
population's resources of information resulted in a backlash against die government
once glasnost was permitted to exist The right to information faced a peculiar
interpretation according to Soviet legislation which convoluted all forms of
information. Most notably was the introduction in the nation of a state censorship
bureau, Glavlit, or the Chief Administration for matters of Literature and Publishing,
that was established in June 6, 1931. Glavlit embodied the Party's objective to secure
every form of information imder legal statute, thus ensuring control over the
population in matters of artistic ejqpression, education, and virtually every type of
communication.
In addition to the institution of controlled information, the Party legislated Articles
70, 190-1 and 190-3 on September 16, 1966, which placed punishment upon those
engaging in anti-Soviet informatiott With the KGB acting as protectorate of Party
interests the population had no choice but to take illegal communication undergroimd,
and the birth of samizdat opposed Glavlit in terms of disseminating information. The
fact that the Party consistently diverted freedom of communication and the right to
information in legal constraints illustrate die insecurity that was a factor in the Party.
Ironically, the Party feared the exact force that brought the Bolsheviks to power, and
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to ccHnbat future insuirection the Party resorted to repression of the same resources
that Lenin utilized.
During the 1905 Revolution in Tsarist Russia Lenin commented on the great
advantages gained throu^ public discourse, the liberty of &e press to disseminate
information, and the educational communication to fiirdier critical mindedness. Yet,
after the Revolution of 1917 brou^t an end to the old order, information tfiat was
previously viewed as valuable was now interpreted against the new regime. The
point was well taken because, as Shane suggests, Party loyalists opposed glasnost
precisely because of the damage information could bring against the Party.
Gorbachev, on the other hand, had a blind-sighted belief in the tenets of socialism
and especially in Leninist socialism. Yet his belief existed for him, as a Party
member, in an isolated world where Party members received the rights denied to
other members of society. For decades the other members of society desired the
opportunity to voice an opinion, to publish a piece of work that reflected a unique
point of tfaou^t, or to engage conversation around an issue of personal importance.
The evidence of persecution against Soviet people \i*^o attempted to communicate
naturally is well documented and disturbing.
Airing an opinion that fell from Party mentality cost greatly in terms of himian
integrity. Such intolerance is heavily chronicled in Reddaway's work on participants
in the Democratic Movement and the distribution of samizdat publications. Those
who were punished for taking part in an exchange of information or in speaking out
for civil liberties were dealt harshly with by the regime. The nature of Soviet society
was always to communicate freely and without fear, but the nature of the Party was
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always to preserve power even if lliat involved subjecting the population to
governing authority because the Party violated fundamental rig|hts from the
beginning.
The language of the dissident reflects the absence of democracy in the Soviet
Union just as the language of authority reflects the absence of democracy within the
Party.

the case of celebrated dissidents Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in

1966, a plea made by Sinyavsky to the Soviet courts illustrates the degree of
frustration at the lack of democracy in the system.
The aiguments which have been flung at me are such that it is impossible to
explain anything.... 'Where are your positive heroes? Ah, you haven't got
any! Ah you are not a socialist! Ah, you are not a realist! Ah, you are not a
Marxist! Ah, you are afantaisiste and an idealist, and you publish abroad into
the bai:gain! Of course you are a coimterrevolutionary!'^^
Having to defend themselves for writing literature tiiat came under tiie interpretation,
by the Party, as anti-Soviet demonstrates flie lack of democracy. Under the Party
standards only propaganda was accorded ri^ts of publication and circulation, a
blatantly biased position tiiat exhibits no tolerance for any differit^ thou^t or
expression. Yet tiie Party's idea of freedom of commimication can be found
succinctly stated in Article 109 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR which states
that freedom of speech, the press, of assembly, and of demonstrations are permitted as
a fimdamental civil rigjit. fronically, the timing of such legislation coincided with
Stalin's purges, which obliterated not only basic rights but human dignity.
When Gorbachev spoke of the need for democratization in the nation, he was
aware, as all Pioty members, of the gross violations of rights under Party government.

" Zigurds L. Zile, Ideas and Forces in Soviet Legal History: A Reader on the Soviet State and Law
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1992), 418.

97

In Memoirs, Gorbachev recounts the words of a speech delivered to the XXVnilh
Congress in which calls attention to the discrepancies in the system and the need for
change—political, economic, and ideological Such words from the Soviet General
Secretary points to &e recognition that a lack of democracy existed before glasnost
and continued to exist then. Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 accounts for the
recognition fliat democracy was not present during Stalinism. Lideed, the absence of
democracy is evidenced in 1921 wdien Kronstadt Insrirgents documented displeasure
with the new regime;
After carrying out the October revolution, the working class had hoped to
achieve its emancipation. But the result was an even greater enslavement of
the human personality. The power of the police and gendarme monarchy
passed into the hands of the Communist usurpers, who, instead of giving the
people freedom, instilled in them constant fear of falling into the torture
chambers of the Cheka, vdiich in their horrors far exceed the gendarme
administration of the tsarist regime. The b^onets, bullets, and gruff
conmiands of the Cheka oprichniki—^these are what the workingman of
Russia has won after so much struggle and suffering.. ..
But most infamous and criminal of all is the moral servitude which the
Commimists have inaugurated: diey have laid their hands on the iimer world
of the toilers, forcing them to think in the Communist way... .Having gained
power, it is only afraid of losing it, and therefore deems every means
permissible..
The declaration emphasizes the character of the Party as powermongers, uninterested
in the plight of the working masses, however, it also underscores the lack of
democratic treatment in a system ^t was founded on a socialist democratic principle
devoted to upholding the rights of the working class.
The truth, which Grorbachev stressed in Perestroika as so urgently required for the
rescue of the system, was that democracy never existed in the Party in any form,
bouigeois to socialist, and in fact the communist ideal denied democratic rights as a

Ibid., 140.
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way to secure political power. The lack of democratic ri^ts was never so apparent
as in the documents of writers that were denied pubhcation because the material
displeased the Party. The truth, provided by glasnost, failed to consolidate the Soviet
system because glasnost actually provided democratization in the fonn of information
liberties and the Party could not endure the content of infoimation that poured from
the population.
In many respects glasnost was democratization for the people because it allowed a
valuable resource to communicate information without fear of persecution. Had the
Parly been democratic in nature, it would have been flexible enough to weigh other
opinions in the spirit of participation. Gorbachev initially welcomed the advantage
glasnost was to bring to his nation. By the time tiie truth was revealed, the leader
shrank from the reform to rally the people to engage in thinking that was typical for
sociaUst enhancement. Shane comments that the most notable contradiction was that
Gorbachev's ideal of socialism was utopi^m in nature and escaped tiie reality of the
system Lenin had created. Lenin's system was void of democracy from the
beginning, because vdien actual democratic reform came to tiie Soviet Union the
nation ceased to exist.
The fact that Lenin had come to power illegitimately in 1917 and perpetuated the
idea of revolution to a communist Utopia eliminated public participation because
Lenin, by reasoning of Marxism, had arrived at all of the answers relevant to the
Soviet population. Lenin's specialty, like Marx and Engels, was revolution and
economics. However, economics does not produce a complete system. The need for
participation in terms of thou^t brings progress to society, ^d when thought is
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Strangled for the good of the system, then one is left with stagnation, as Gorbachev
encountered, of a system that will never move forward.
Notable to the definition of what constitutes democratization in a system is John
Stuart Mill's theory concerning liberty. Mill contends that the pohtical order is
responsible for preventing vice and promoting virtue and the best means for assuring
such a combination comes tiirou^

law, criminal and civil, and public opinion.^' Law

exists as a tangible measure of permissible and impermissible, where public opinion
exists as the intangible element that reflects society's moral standard. Free
expression is powerful because it allows a continuum of thought and ideas. The idea
of progress as an evolutionary process of education and development requires new
thought and ideas in order to be productive. Therefore, as MiU suggests, free
expression is required for the privileges it bestows on society just as law is required to
protect those privileges.
Goihachev's understanding of democracy, while flawed, was certainly well
intended. In reviewing the former Soviet leader's convictions on the socialist
principle, he exhibits unfailing confidence in the system and in the future of his
nation. It is an ironic convergence that both Lenin and Gorbachev use the wcn-d
democracy yet have no real understanding of what democratic rights encompass.
According to Volkogonov's analysis of Lenin, the founder of the Communist Party
had little comprehension of democracy. In the same vein Doder and Branson remark
that Grorbachev paid lip service to democracy in speeches and in publications yet note

" John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New Yoric: TTie Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), 64.
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that '^ese ri^ts and freedoms were debated in the context of economic reform...
Gorbachev does not speak of liberty in his book, and he rarely mentions individual
li^ts."^" The irony is that both the founder and the final Soviet Union leader did not
recognize die necessity for individual freedom, a cornerstone of democracy.
The necessity of democracy in ^e context of glasnost, free e^ession, is best
e7q>lained according to Mill's theory concerning individual liberties within the
society. Mill speaks to the necessity of a "moral compact" between tiie individual
and society as a way to balance the interests of both. If society is allowed to repress
the individual Ihrou^ laws, progress is hampered. By the same token if individuals
have no allegiance to the good of the society in which they live, progress is also
hampered. Thus, it is according to a moral standard, or law, that individuals should
conduct themselves in their society. The moral standard is established according to
mutual values which will benefit both the individual as well as the society. As for the
role of society in the compact

contends;

[L]et not society pretend that it needs.. .the power to issue conunands and
enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals in which, on all
principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest witii those who are
to abide the consequences.. .it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit
and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority and do with
ostentation tiie exact opposite of vy^t it enjoins.
Mill's argument for the moral compact illustrates the necessity for democratic
liberties in the interest of social progress because the pursuit for truth is an ongoing
process and is necessary for progression.

Doder and Branson, Goibadiev: Heretic in the Kremlin. 251.
^'MiU. On Liberty. 101.
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In contrast to ^/fill's theory regarding democracy, Gorbachev submits his own
interpretation of the process of democratization. It is interesting that Gkvbachev also
views the moral standard as imperative, commenting that the "moral aspect is of
tremendous importance."^^ The defining difference in Gorbachev's interpretation of
democracy resides in his perspective that the Party must conduct the society and the
individuals according to Soviet socialist objectives,

such an qjproach,

Gorbachev still regarded tiie Party as integral in directing the citizens according to
socialist principles. The liberty to act independently from the government as
individuals determined, particularly in areas such as freedom of speech, of the press,
or right to assembly, was considered counter to the socialist premise of collective
effort in the Soviet UniotL
It must be noted then that Lenin had instilled in the Party a vanguard mentality
that the commimist ideology was the ultimate truth. Consequently, commimism not
only supplied an end result for everyone, regardless of diversity in thought or opinion,
but through the use of terror enforced the submission to the communist objective.
Lenin also suggested that "democratic centralism" be instituted in the Party vanguard
as a way to facilitate a forum for opposition where discourse could occur between the
two levels of govenmient concerning issues and, after suitable dialogue, a decision
would be ultimately reached by the higher Party conunittee. Democratic centralism,
as Lenin's pre-revolutionaiy notion of social democracy, was non-existent in practice.
Lenin's legacy to the Party held no democratic credibility, a position that was
unenviable when Gorbachev called for democratization in tiie use of glasnost.

^ Mikhail S.Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Hiinkiiig for Our Country and the Worid (New Yoric:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 103.
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Speaking of the need for glasnost in the media Gorbachev commented diat
"[cjriticism can be an effective instrument of perestroika only if it is based on
absolute truth and scrupulous concern for justice."^^ Ironically, wh^ Gk>ibachev
urged truth in glasnost, the incorporation of public participation in submitting
opinions and engaging in debate, he unwitting was engaging democratization by
acknowledging the legitimate need for individuals and society to have the freedom to
communicate. At &e same time, Gorbachev sounded the death knell for the Party
v^o had restricted personal liberties for the sake of the political authority, but
Gorbachev's decision to initiate glasnost was a testament to his belief in the virtues of
democracy, aside from his nation's communist history. Gorbachev's realization that
the society was faltering signaled his desire to reconcile individual interests with that
of society and the state. However, (Gorbachev's priority in introducing refonn was to
bolster the state and societal structure together without giving credibility to the
participation of the individual. Clearly, the contradiction for Gorbachev revolved
around the society and the individual.
Mill argues tiiat it is better for the whole of society if the individual prospers
without interference from the government, suggesting that:
The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of
individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when instead
of informing, advising, and upon occasion, denouncing it makes them work in
fetters.. .The worth of a State, in flie long run, is the worth of the individuals
composing it; and a State vdiich postpones the interests of their mental
e?q)ansion and elevation to a little more of administrative skiU. . .will find that
with small men no great thing can really be accomplished.^

Ibid,79.
^ Mill. On Liberty. 140/1.
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Gorbachev's task, to bring democratic procedure into the public forum, was
complicated by his insistence that the socialist truth was absolute, and that the country
could indeed prosper under a system that was grossly lacking in political plurality. In
point of fact the Party fliat Lenin had brought to power knew only control throu^ top
down force \^ch was plainly undemocratic.
The reaction to glasnost was a contradiction to Parly policy as evidenced by
Gorbachev's recanting of his reform. Shane contends that by 1991 Gorbachev "had
dramatically retreated from reform,because he witnessed the contradictions to his
original goals. The fact that the Party tumbled from power in the face of the illegal,
and ill-fated, attempted coiip illustrates the power fliat glasnost had effected. Soviet
politics could not continue as a single-Party system governing a society that desired
the democratic value of pluralism in politics and society.

^ Shane, Disniantling Utopia:How Information Ended the Soviet Union. 248.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

Examitiing Ifae sociopolitical course that Russia has taken, it is evident that
Kavelin's state school theory is valid. Russia iinited folly under the Tsardom
instituted with Ivan IE, extending the ruling order to the fated 20*'" centuiy when the
Romanov's were finally eradicated in 1918. The Tsarist form of government
accomplished two objectives, to unify Russia under a nationalist banner and establish
a i^stem ^t left little opportunity for opposition, externally and intemally.
Consequently, Russia existed as a secured state that could survive intercontinental
challenges as well as strangling potential discord among the subject population.
Notably, under the authority of Ivan IV, the role of the Russian population was
defined according to the needs of the state and also to the whims of the Tsar.
Yanov's assessment that autocratic will was consolidated with the implementation of
the Oprichniki e^lains the significance of future control procedures employed by the
system, tsarist and Soviet. Therefore, the population was not only placed into a social
role, not of &eir choosing, but prescribed by political rule, and as a response to
potential opposition the political police assured compliance. Additionally, ^e
founder of St. Petersburg envisioned a fortress that would serve as protectorate of the
nation, fortified with military advantage and enforced by means of legalized national
allegiance. Even though PetCT the Great failed to witness the completion of St.
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Petersburg, the legacy of his militarization became a cornerstone of future political
direction in Russia.
If Ivan IV and Peter I defined the defense system of Russia, their successor
Catherine the Great defined cultural standards. Emphasizing the Enli^tenment of
European courts, Empress Catherine paved the way for Russia's participation in the
flowering era of intellectuals. In particular, the introduction of European
personalities and cultural diversity, while limited chiefly to the political and social
elite, significantly changed the landscape of Russian political and social discourse.
The window to Europe that Peter opened was surely beautified with Catiierine's
impressive aesthetic contributions, but more important were tiie alternative
considerations that came alive for Russian enlightened thinkers. In many ways, '^ew
blinking" began under Catherine's rule, yet the Empress cared little for nurturing
adverse political reactions to her policies concerning ^e social welfare of her
subjects.
The theme of individual sacrifice for the stability of the state remained
indisputable, and particularly those who would challenge the system as inadequate to
social progress were summarily dismissed. The nationalist identity of Russia by the
19^ century was unique primarily because the collectivization mentality resisted
reform that would encourage personal advantage. While men such as Radishchev
observed injustices present in the sociopolitical structure, the lack of interest by the
popidation and the elite to redirect changes was an incredible factor in the intellectual
fi-agility of the nation's system. There was little to gain and much to lose by
challenging the present order, convoluted as it was, a view vdiich Lincoln stresses in
his analysis of the enlightened men of pre-revolutionary Russia.
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By the end of the 19®* century the economic factors came into play, affecting
not only the masses of peasant and workers but the controlling power as well.
Althou^ industrialized Europe was engaged in the growing pains of urbanization and
legislation to accommodate economic progress, Russia continued to survive in the
tradition of peasant standards—the primary incentive was to merely survive.
Certainly the conditions that brought Lenin to tiie fore of revolutionaiy activity were
a mix of rapid disenchantment with living standards and the antiquated system of rule
that had persisted for centuries. At tiie turn of &e century, the ''enli^tened
bureaucrats" of Russia still were greatly insignificant and thus unable to be of
influence to the autocratic order of political power, or to propose more conciliatory
means than revolution in achieving that same end.
Certainly the forces against Tsar Nicholas n consisted of a multitude of factors
brought about external coincidences, the First World War among them. Internally,
Lenin and the Bolsheviks operated covertly in establishing tiieir Party until political
factions became legal after tiie Revolution of 1905. At the crossroads, Lenin led the
revolution into a complete eradication of the Romanovs, subverted political
opposition from the Mensheviks and the Provisional Goveniment after the February
Revolution in 1917, and directed an assault in the form of War Commimism against
the Russian nation in the name of the revolution. In seizing and consolidating power
Lenin garnered support from those who favored political plurality, the inclusion of
the worker population in sociopolitical issues, and the peasuits that sought a
progressive existence and not merely survival. Ironically, the veiy socialist
revolution which the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's lead, encouraged to displace the
monarchical order never came to fruition.
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The reality that accompanied the Communist Party to power in 1918 consisted
of autocracy, not socialism, and certainly never democracy. It is essential to establish
that Lenin had little interest in social welfare or in any degree of democratic rights
and liberties prinfiarily because Gorbachev consistently called on the Leninist
principles to encourage glasnost and pereslroika. In many ways, this was the ultimate
contradiction, and one that Gorbachev has never formerly addressed. Why Leninism
was in line with Gorbachev's democratic socialism theoretically is puzzling in the
context of Gorbachev's desire for economic and political progression in the Soviet
Union. As Volkogonov comments:
To achieve power, the Bolsheviks became wedded forever to violence, while
liberty was buried in the marriage. Lenin's address 'To the Citizens of
Russia', following his coup, and his decrees promising peace and land, say
nothing about liberty as the main aim of the revolution.. .The Russian
revolution, which formally gave the people peace and land, cunningly
replaced flie idea of liberty with that of the abolition of the exploitation of man
by man. Li giving the spectre of hope, Lenin had found and trapped man's
most robust and vital element, that of failh. He thus condemned the Russians
for decades to contenting themselves with hope alone. ^
From the beginning Lenin operated under the revolutionary banner with no intention
of allowing political plurality and certainly no civil liberties. Instead tfie mantra of
the Communist Party became the elimination of the "enemies of the people," but the
"people," as Gorbachev pointed out after his fall from power, had never been the
citizens, but the Parly.
In dismissing the civil liberties that would have been necessary for pr(^essive
reform, Lenin and the Party erected a poUtical stronghold that carried over the same

' Dirritri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 73.
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traditions of autocratic nile from before. The pivotal point was that Lenin, as the
heir to intelligentsia reform of the IP**" century, utilized the press, assembly, and
discourse in nations that granted those rights to the public. Lenin advantaged his
revolutionary position ^ou^ publications of his paper Iskra. or the Spark, which he
began in London in 1900, and circulated in Russia, albeit covertly. After the
legislation in 1905, tiie Bolsheviks practiced opposition politics legally, gaining seats
in the Duma that was instituted under Nicholas U. After the Bolsheviks seized power,
Lenin continued to publish articles on the Party and communist objectives on an
international scale. Consequently, the regime overtook any democratic initiatives
from the Bolsheviks platform of socialist democracy, and directed fiill revolutionary
energy toward world dominance of the Party. In Russia, renamed the Soviet Union
after the revolution, the most ftmdamental of personal liberties were extinguished,
and the Party resorted to the traditional strong-arming policies of political policing to
guarantee submission. In addition, 1921 communist legislation disallowed factions,
and in 1918, Glavlit policed public discourse and prohibited written communications
tiiat led to exchange of information.
The Party rejected all information that deviated from the socialist objectives of the
revolution yet the ironic point was that there never existed any form of socialism in
Soviet Russia from which to deviate. For that reason, it was imperative that the Party
secure power flirou^ any means possible, including restricting mobilization, and aU
forms of information found throu^ educational resources as well as common
communications such as personal conversation. In effect, every avenue that would
threaten the power of tihie Party was checked and enforcibly controlled. More
importantly, the same advantages which the Party took to secxire their power, through
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propagandized information, speeches, and massive campaigns, were denied to the
rest of the public.
The crux of the issue was that the repression, which was enforced by the Party,
portrayed their regime as benevolent and most accommodating to the needs of the
people. The same policies that Lenin took advantage of to gain revolutionaiy favor
with the masses, "Land and Bread," served tfie policies of the Party for decades.
Unfortunately the reality was ^t there never existed a legitimate socialist democratic
policy to serve the people, and as a consequence, societal ills began to take a toll on
the nation's economy as well.
Gorbachev admittedly laid the blame for the sluggish condition of the society and
economy on the Party apparatus, yet he also clung to the ideal of the Commxmist
Party instituted under Lenin. Hope was still in the ofGng, as Lenin had led the nation
to believe, some seventy years earlier. The difference between Gorbachev and Lenin
was that Gorbachev lived the life of a communist comrade and witnessed first-hand
tiie lack of motivation, ambition, and resolve that was so needed by the nation if it
were to survive. Gorbachev, £^ain like his predecessors, insisted the Party was
capable of elevating socialism to its fullest potential. Unlike Lenin, Gorbachev
employed democratization to help the process along.
Glasnost epitomized democratization primarily because it escaped the singular
control that had defined Party politics, and in fact, most all of Russia's political
histoiy. The impact of glasnost was twofold—shaking the stability of the Party
authority and stirring the consciousness of the public to democratic participation.
Without pubUc opinion the backlash against the Party structure would never have
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occuired, a consequence which Gorbachev had not considered in his visions for
Soviet socialism.
Gorbachev is critically acclaimed to have conceded ultimately to Western
democratic experiences, especially with the fall of communist centralized planning,
specifically in terms of economics. True, Gorbachev possessed the foresight to begin
restrocturing in tiie Soviet Union, but his intention was never to dissolve the political
epicenter in the nation. According to Gorbachev, the Party remained a viable entity
that only needed rejuvenating to embrace true Marxism-Leninism. However, glasnost
rejected the very premise that Lenin's illegitimate seizure of power had begun
seventy years earlier. In effect, glasnost escaped from its liberator, and Gorbachev
remains today a victim of his own reform process, a fact which he acknowledges in
his publications and interviews.
The absence of pubUc discourse among the Soviet populace magnified the lack of
democracy. Sakharov and SoMienitsyn, while politically at odds over how best to
rectify the lack of personal liberties in the nation, both were committed to bring
awareness to society. In many ways they represent the value of democratic discourse,
that is, opposing opinions that operate in an effort to understand another's
perspective. Sakharov's call for an "open" society reflected the political need to
include people in issues that affected societal welfare and progress instead of
Growing up a wall of governmental intolerance. Solzhenitsyn appeals to a limited
role for government in public discourse, a characteristic of democratic systems. Both
men saw the injustices created by rejecting a public forum £md not holding the
political power accountable.

Ill

While it is not the intent of this thesis to hold Western democratic values up as
the preferred standard, tiiere continues to be merit in the political theories presented
by J. S. Mil, especially in the context of the problems which resulted after glasnost
was introduced. Sunmiarily, Mill argues that the value which aUows society to
progress is tolerance of diversity of opinions, and if suppressed by the authority widi
majority approval, fliere is a violation committed against the people for failing to
respect an alternative opinion. Mill's definition of liberty centers around the
necessity for the public to engage in debate in pursuit of the truth. Therefore, the idea
that authority can silence the public to avoid the unpleasant truth suggests that one
opinion is infallible and rejects an alternative opinion. Such an attitude is maintained,
not in the interest of progress and &e pursuit of truth, but rather to enforce singleness
of mind and to hold onto power for fear of opposition.^
Most provocative are Ae words of Gorbachev in Perestroika tiiat spoke of the
necessity of truth in public information. Yet, as Grorbachev appealed to the virtues of
public debate in order that perestroika could progress, he consistently reverted to
Party practices of strangling any point of view that threatened the power of the
Communist Party. The most revealing actions taken on the part of the Party to
enforce compliance came about between 1988 and 1991, exactly corresponding to tiie
time glasnost became powerful in raising awareness.
Glasnost, in effect, became Gorbachev's enemy for two reasons. Primarily
because glasnost defied the Party's singular consciousness which was unacceptable to
Gortxachev as leader of the Soviet Union. It was not a question of whether Gorbachev

^ John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York; The Liberal Arts Press, 1993), 64.
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believed in the capability of the Party, or the Marxist-Leninist doctrines which he
tiiought had penetrated into the core of society without disturbing the autocratic
integrity. It was not even a question of exploring "new thinking" to bolster the
system that Gorbachev believed would endure. In reading Gorbachev's speeches and
book Perestroika, it is evident that he had no intention of deviating from Leninist
objectives. Thus, "new flunking" only meant for Goitachev rearranging things to be
more compliant to the goals which were put down in 1917.
Doder and Branson, Shane, Sakharov, and Solzhenitsyn all speak to the notion that
reform for Gorbachev meant preserving the authority of the Party with fringe
democratization. Notably, Gorbachev stresses in Perestroika that the system was
flexible enough to withstand democracy and declares his reform program to be a
success among working people. It is impossible not to detect the narrowness of his
intended policies, economic resurgence and a more efiicient bureaucratic
administration. The whole perestroika "revolution" barely scratched the surface of
inherent problems that haunted tiie Soviet state—the lack of democratic resolve. Yes,
Gorbachev made reference to "letting in more light" under glasnost and yes, he caUed
for an increase in democratic procedure, but in no way did he ever suspect that
glasnost was completely incompatible with flie system, past, present, and future.
The term, glasnost, was sparingly referred to in the Perestroika volume yet under
glasnost tiie crux of the problems that had led Russia and the Soviet Union into an
existence of decay became magnified. For centuries Russians have been exploited by
their own government. When Lenin came to power it never occurred to him that the
people were ready to be a part of the system of government, not just producers for the
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State economy. Power imder Lenin and the Party essentially excluded the people
from sociopolitical issues, therefore sociopolitical progress.
Gorbachev's reform glasnost suipassed governing interests to include the people's
opinions, the second reason why glasnost alienated Gorbachev. Glasnost defied
Gk)rbachev's objectives because the former Soviet leader failed to imderstand the
democratic need for social participation that transcended economics. Consequently,
as glasnost began to encourage an airing of opinions, tiie public became consumers of
information instead of producers of goods. Essentially, information became the
enemy of the Party in a way for which Gorbachev was never prepared. As Shane
comments, those who opposed perestroika and glasnost for fear of the collapse of the
Party order were correct. Moreover, Grorbachev's contention in Memoirs that he
sincerely wanted democratization for the nation while insisting that the Party line was
most favorable suggests that he continued to hold Marxism-Leninism in higher
esteem than the population of the Soviet Union. Such discrepancies in Gorbachev's
perspective point to a lack of understanding in matters of civil participation. While
he embraced reform, and encouraged glasnost, Gorbachev continued to stress the
advantages of Leninism and of socialist democracy, neither one of which held any
democratic agenda for the individual or society.
Glasnost could never fulfill Gorbachev's expectations as Soviet leader, but the
democracy that glasnost effected propelled the information revolution through the
entire nation within four years of being initiated. Consequently, glasnost toppled the
Soviet myth, created by Lenin and perpetuated by decades of propaganda. More
importantly, glasnost challenged the system that exacted terror against its citizens
throu^ ruthless enforcement, a trademark of both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes.
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Openness of communication spirited away any hope of social unity under
Par^ auspices, yet the open forum of information that glasnost created took on a
power of its own. For the Russian people glasnost presented the truth about their oneParty system that brought a painful reality, but also the hope for continued democratic
order. The August coup of 1991, staged against Gorbachev by Party hardliners was
crushed by pubUc opposition and a defiant political plurality never before present in
the nation. The results of glasnost encouraged democratic principles of participation
and competition. The actions of the cmispirators spoke only of seizing political
power in an illegitimate fashion, a typical Party characteristic that was not
democratic. Shane comments on the events of that month as precariously tipped
toward the old order of dictatorship, specifically the repression of information. The
trend of glasnost defined "new thixiking," but not according to the old govermnent,
which ^e failed coup illustrates.
Primarily, glasnost, according to Gorbachev's interpretation was not successful;
however, glasnost, according to the interpretation of the public was a success. By
extending the rights of expression through glasnost Grorbachev unintentionally
allowed the pubUc consciousness to come into being on a legitimate scale.
Thereafter, the direction in which glasnost leads the former Soviet Union can only be
attributed to the people. Plurality of opinion serves the interest of the people, and the
necessity for freedom of information is a virtue in a democratic society. The mistake
that Gorbachev made was in expecting that openness, glasnost, would lead logically
to communist values and neglect the value of individuaUty. The real fault, as Shane

115

comments, "is laid at the feet not just of Stalin but of Lenin and the Revolution,"^
for implementing a system of intolerance against the individuals that contributed to
the nation. Glasnost not only challenged the system, at a pubUc level, but produced a
new social standard that finally embraced the democracy Gorbachev encouraged and
finally eradicated repressive poUtics practiced by the Communist Party.

^ Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
Publisher, 1994), 122.
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